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In the first chapter of the dissertation, two administrative datasets from the Targeted 
Social Assistance Program (unconditional cash transfer) and National Assessment and 
Examination Center in Georgia are merged in order to investigate the impact of an unconditional 
cash transfer on the university enrollment rate in Georgia. Given that the program recipients 
were selected by virtue of being below a certain quantitative poverty threshold, this feature of the 
program is exploited to implement a global regression discontinuity. The study finds a positive 
impact of cash transfers on enrollment in tertiary education. Specifically, being a recipient of the 
social assistance program significantly increases a student’s likelihood of enrollment, by 6.3%. 
More importantly, the findings suggest that the observed effect is gender specific: the impact is 
stronger for males. Male children of a beneficiary family have a 13.4% greater chance of being 
admitted to university. This marks the first attempt to study such a program in the context of 
education. The paper contributes to the growing literature on the long-run effects of cash 
transfers.  
In the second chapter, the impact on a broad range of outcomes of the same social 
assistance program in Georgia is examined. An original household survey was developed and 
conducted in 2014, and a total of 340 households living in Tbilisi participated. A local regression 
discontinuity approach was employed to evaluate the unconditional cash transfer program in 
Georgia. In this study we found that receiving the transfer leads to a worsening in (self-reported) 
basic economic conditions, such as the ability to afford food. The recipients' worsening of 
economic conditions relative to the control is genuine, which begs the natural question: why? 
One possibility is that the program crowds out other sources of income or, alternatively, 
receiving the transfer could reduce incentives to work. Another possibility is that the recipients 
invest both the transfers and additional resources in investments in durable goods or human 
capital. This could then lead to a temporary lower ability to afford food (and similar patterns) in 
the time window of the survey.  
The third chapter investigates how a unique education policy positively affected 
university enrollment rates of public school students in Georgia. In 2007, the Georgian 
government enacted legislation mandating the replacement of all public school principals under 
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the assumption that the replacement of the principals with random assignation of qualified 
candidates to public schools would decentralize and improve school governance across Georgia 
in a fair manner. About half the public school principals were actually replaced with new 
candidates and a majority of them were assigned through a random allocation mechanism. 
Therefore, the standard difference-in-differences methodology is used to compare treated public 
schools with private schools that are not affected by the policy, in order to identify how this 
reform impacted education outcomes. Using the National Assessment and Examination Center 
university admissions data, the public schools with replaced principals increased university 
enrollment more than the control schools, by an average of 4%. The largest part of this increase 
comes from schools with randomly assigned principals. The positive findings herein could 
impact education policy in developing (and perhaps developed) countries. The statistically 
significant and strong effects of this type of reform could cause a positive domino effect in the 








V první kapitole této dizertační práce slučujeme data z cíleného programu sociálních 
dávek (nepodmíněný transfer hotovosti) s daty z gruzínského národního a zkušebního centra, 
abychom analyzovali vliv nepodmíněného transferu hotovosti na míru zápisů na vysoké školy 
v Gruzii. Vzhledem k tomu,  že výše zmíněný program poskytoval hotovostní transfer pouze 
jedincům, kteří byli pod určitou kvantitativně měřitelnou hladinou chudoby, používáme v této 
studii metodu globálního regression discontinuity designu. Nacházíme pozitivní vliv peněžních 
transferů na míru zápisů na vysoké školy. Být příjemcem transferu v rámci programu sociální 
podpory konkrétně zvyšuje pravděpodobnost zápisu na vysokou školu o 6,3%. Důležitým 
zjištěním také je, že výsledky ukazují, že vliv výše zmíněného programu je vyšší pro muže než 
pro ženy. Chlapci z chudých rodin, které dostávají peníze skrze program sociální podpory, mají o 
13,4% vyšší šanci, že se dostanou na vysokou školu než chlapci pocházející z rodin, které 
transfer neobdržely. Tato analýza je prvním pokusem o zkoumání efektu podobného programu 
v rámci vzdělávacího systému a zároveň přispívá k rostoucí literatuře zabývající se dlouhodobým 
vlivem hotovostních tranferů. 
Ve druhé kapitole zkoumáme vliv stejného gruzínského programu sociální podpory na 
širší spektrum proměnných. V roce 2014 bylo vyvinuto a zorganizováno originální dotazníkové 
šetření, kterého se zúčastnilo 340 domácností pocházejících z Tbilisi. Ve své analýze používáme 
metodu lokálního regression discontinuity designu, abychom zhodnotili výsledky 
nepodmíněného transferu peněžních prostředků v Gruzii.  Výsledky studie ukazují, že obdržení 
peněžního transferu vede ke zhoršení (dle subjektivních výpovědí dotázaných o sobě samých) 
základních ekonomických podmínek, jako je například nedostatek prostředků ke koupi 
základních potravin. Horší ekonomické podmínky jedinců, kteří obdrželi transfer oproti kontrolní 
skupině, logicky vede k otázce: „Proč tomu tak je?“ Jedna z možností je to, že státní transfer 
vytlačuje alternativní zdroje obživy, jinými slovy lidé, kteří dostávají peníze od státu, mají menší 
motivaci pracovat. Další možností může být to, že příjemci transferů investují jak své původní, 
tak i nové prostředky do investičních statků dlouhodobé spotřeby nebo do lidského kapitálu. 
Toto může vést k dočasnému zhoršení jejich finanční situace a k následnému snížení jejich 
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schopnosti pořídit si základní potraviny, což je skutečnost objevující se v časovém rámci námi 
zkoumaného dotazníkového šetření. 
Ve třetí kapitole se zabýváme tím, jak politická intervence v gruzínském vzdělávacím systému 
ovlivnila míru zápisů středoškolských studentů z veřejných škol na vysoké školy. Za účelem 
decentralizace a zlepšení spravování veřejných škol, vyhlásila gruzínská vláda v roce 2007 v celé 
zemi výběrová řízení na pozici ředitelů veřejných středních škol, přičemž nově zvolení ředitelé 
měli být více kvalifikovaní pro vedení těchto vzdělávacích institucí. Tento vládní zákrok vedl 
k odchodu asi poloviny původních ředitelů veřejných středních škol a na jejich místa nastoupili 
nově zvolení jedinci. Noví ředitelé byli rozděleni mezi střední školy většinou namátkově. Ke 
zjištění efektu této intervence používáme standardní metodu difference –in-differences, v níž 
porovnáváme ovlivněné veřejné střední školy se soukromými středními školami, na něž se 
intervence nevztahovala. Za použití dat z národního zkušebního a posuzovacího centra o počtu 
přijatých na vysoké školy zjišťujeme, že veřejné střední školy s novými řediteli mají v průměru o 
4% vyšší míru zápisů žáků na vysoké školy než kontrolní skupina soukromých středních škol. 
Nejvyšší nárůst míry zápisů zaznamenaly školy s náhodně přidělenými řediteli. Námi nalezený 
pozitivní vliv této intervence by tedy mohl také ovlivnit politiky jiných rozvojových zemí (a snad 
i politiky rozvinutých zemí). Tak silný a statisticky významný efekt tohoto typu politické 
reformy by mohl vést k výraznému rozšíření podobných intervencí i v dalších rozvojových 








This dissertation is made up of three chapters within the economics of education branch 
of literature.  The first chapter looks at how unconditional cash transfers from the Georgian 
government to the poor of the country affected university enrollment rates.  Cash transfer 
programs are widely used as a tool to fight poverty. Most developing countries spend between 
1% and 2% of GDP on cash transfers and international donors also invest substantially in cash 
transfer programs (Arnold, Conway, and Greenslade. 2011). Aid is crucial in terms of moving 
people out of this vicious cycle. A more skeptical view, though, is that cash transfers reduce 
people’s incentives to solve their own problems and that cash transfer recipients may be tempted 
to engage in conspicuous consumption (alcohol, drugs, ceremonial activities, entertainment, etc.) 
instead of investing in education, health, and other areas with long-term benefits. 
Ultimately, the effectiveness of cash transfer programs is an empirical question. In this 
paper, we study the impact of a cash transfer program in Georgia on enrollment in tertiary 
education. The program was introduced in 2005, and involved unconditional cash transfers to 
people living in extreme poverty. Program recipients were selected by virtue of being below a 
certain quantitative poverty threshold. We use this feature of the program to implement a 
regression discontinuity design (RDD) approach. 
Studies of the impact of family income on teenage/child development and scholastic 
achievements generally face an income endogeneity problem. The previous literature mostly 
employs randomized experiments that offer very strong internal validity. However, they typically 
do not consider long-term outcomes and are based on relatively small sample sizes. 
Observational studies thus have a useful role to play in complementing evidence from field 
experiments. Using regression discontinuity design in program evaluation is still very rare (Duflo 
& Kremer, 2005; Ravallion, 2007). In order to separately identify the effects attributed to 
additional income from those of other unobserved characteristics, it is important to study the 
impact of exogenous variation in family income with a credible methodology such as the 




The second chapter studies the same unconditional cash transfer program, but employs an 
ex-post, original survey that created new data for the analysis of the program’s effects on the 
general wellbeing of the recipient households versus non-recipient households in Tbilisi. Cash 
transfers to the poor have become a cornerstone of social policy in developing countries. 
Following the success of Progresa/Oportunidadesa in Mexico and Bolsa Familia in Brazil, many 
countries have adopted similar schemes (Barrientos and Hulme 2009). Correspondingly, a large 
literature has developed to evaluate the impact of cash transfers on recipient outcomes (for a 
review see Arnold, Conway, and Greenslade. 2011). 
Elementary microeconomics suggests that the extra income from the cash transfer 
program could affect their overall income in two directions. First, the extra money necessarily 
increases total income from the start and can be spent on direct consumption or into productive 
investments, such as household or small business production. Second, the extra money can 
reduce earned income through the income effect. Labor supply of the household could thus be 
reduced, as the household would not need to work as much to earn as much as they had before. 
Alternatively, the added income could cause a preference shift such that the household would 
want to work even more to have even greater consumption ability to accompany their increased 
social mobility.  The distribution and level of spending would certainly be an outcome of the 
total income of the household, but it would likely remain the same if the household reduces their 
labor supply, or would increase in terms of consumption and/or investment if the household does 
not reduce their labor supply as much or even increases it. Increased consumption could take 
many forms according to utility preferences, but investment would most likely occur along the 
dimensions of durable goods, production capital, or human capital. 
In this paper, an original household survey and a regression discontinuity approach are 
employed to evaluate a Targeted Social Assistance program (unconditional cash transfer) in 
Georgia. It is found that receiving the transfers leads to a worsening in (self-reported) basic 
economic conditions, such as the ability to afford food. A number of possible mechanisms that 
explain this counterintuitive result are discussed in the text, including crowding out from other 
sources of income as well as dynamic changes in behaviors and preference due to relaxed budget 





The third chapter utilizes a unique education policy to analyze the impact of the mass 
replacement of school principals on student scholastic outcomes, in the form of university 
enrollment rates. The main objective of any school system is to improve student learning 
outcomes, cognitive skills, and socialization in society. In order to reach this objective and make 
schools more efficient, specific efforts are made by teachers, staff, and the principal school-wide. 
It is widely believed (Branch et al, 2012; Bloom et al., 2015 and Oduro et al, 2007) that the 
quality of the principal plays an important role in a school’s organizational success, as well as 
significantly affecting student scholastic achievements. 
Under the Georgian political initiative to decentralize school governance, the Ministry of 
Education and Science issued an order (N543) in July 2007, officially dismissing all public 
school principals and subsequently “randomly” assigning qualified candidates to public schools 
across the country, under the assumption that the replacement of the principals with randomly 
assigning qualified candidates to public schools would fairly decentralize and improve school 
governance across Georgia. About half of the public school principals were actually replaced 
with new candidates, a majority of whom were assigned through a random allocation 
mechanism.  
Accordingly, this paper uses a standard difference-in-differences methodology to 
compare treated public schools with private schools that are not affected by the policy, in order 
to identify how this reform impacted education outcomes. Using the National Assessment and 
Examination Center university admissions data, it can be seen that the public schools with 
replaced principals increased university enrollment more than the control schools by an average 
of 4%. The largest part of this increase comes from schools with randomly assigned principals.  
As the majority of schools are financed by the government in most countries (including 
Georgia), public finance efficacy makes it necessary to create and implement policies that ensure 
that the highest quality principals are selected (or assigned) to public schools. The positive 
findings herein could impact education policy in developing (and perhaps developed) countries 
and invites further research where applicable. The statistically significant and strong effects of 
this type of reform could cause a positive domino effect in the developing world, especially in 





Chapter 1: Education for the Poor 
 
 





Cash transfer programs are widely used as a tool to fight poverty. Most developing 
countries spend between 1% and 2% of GDP on cash transfers and international donors also 
invest substantially in cash transfer programs (Arnold, Conway, and Greenslade. 2011). The 
rationale for cash transfers is neatly summarized in Banerjee and Duflo (2011), who write that 
people become trapped in poverty due to geography and adversity. For those living barely above 
subsistence level, productivity is difficult without securing health and food provision, because 
they must focus most of their energy on subsistence items like food and shelter simply to 
survive.  
Therefore, aid is crucial in terms of moving people out of this vicious cycle. A more 
skeptical view, though, is that cash transfers reduce people’s incentives to solve their own 
problems and that cash transfer recipients may be tempted to engage in conspicuous 
consumption (alcohol, drugs, ceremonial activities, entertainment, etc.) instead of investing in 
education, health, and other areas with long-term benefits. 
Ultimately, the effectiveness of cash transfer programs is an empirical question. In this 
paper, we study the impact of a cash transfer program in Georgia on enrollment in tertiary 
education. The program was introduced in 2005, and involved unconditional cash transfers to 
people living in extreme poverty. Program recipients were selected by virtue of being below a 
certain quantitative poverty threshold. We use this feature of the program to implement a 
regression discontinuity design (RDD) approach. RDD allows for the neutralization of greater 
economic effects and idiosyncratic characteristics that obscure causal inference through standard 
means analyses by concentrating on very similar households just around a given threshold. 
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We find a positive impact of cash transfers on admittance into tertiary education and we 
also find that being a recipient of the program significantly increases a student’s likelihood of 
admittance, by 6.3%. Specifically, the proportion of admitted individuals out of the total number 
of applicants increased from 12.7% to 13.5%. Furthermore, we find that the observed effect is 
gender specific—the impact is stronger for males. On average, male children of beneficiary 
families are more likely to be admitted to university, by 13.3%, than male children of non-
beneficiary families. 
Our study contributes to the growing literature on the long-run effects of cash transfers, 
which has emerged as an important topic in development economics. Researchers have examined 
the effects of cash transfers on recipients’ consumption patterns (Jensen & Miller, 2008; 
Attanasio & Mesnard, 2006), savings and investments (Gertler, Martinez, & Rubio-Codina, 
2012), labor supply (Bertrand, Mullainathan, & Miller; 2003; Dabalen, Kilic, & Wane, 2008) 
and the effectiveness of the poverty alleviation programs (Coady, Grosh, and Hoddinott 2004). 
Significant research has been devoted to the impact of cash transfers on education. De 
Brauw and Hoddinott (2011) study the effect of conditional cash transfers at school enrollment in 
Mexico. Using nearest neighborhood matching and fixed effects regressions, the study found that 
for those households who misperceived transfers as unconditional, school enrollment was 
significantly lower. Barrera-Osorio, Bertrand, Linden, and Perez-Calle (2008) use a randomized 
experiment and show that cash incentives increase school attendance and graduation rates. 
Alternatively, Dahl and Lochner (2008) identify a positive and significant effect (6% 
improvement in math and reading exams) of family income on scholastic achievements by 
exploiting exogenous variation of income for American families through the earned income tax 
credit program, which can be considered a form of unconditional cash transfer in relation to 
education outcomes. 
Baird, McIntosh, and Özler (2011) performed a randomized control trial to evaluate the 
role of conditionality of cash transfers. They conclude that conditional cash transfers are more 
effective at reducing dropout rates and increasing scores in English reading tests. Oosterbeek, 
Ponce, and Schady (2008) evaluate the impact of cash transfer programs (aimed at increasing 
school attendance) on school enrollment in Ecuador, and find that for the poorest households the 
impact is positive, but the effect disappears for the households in the second quintile of the 
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income distribution. Fack and Grenet (2015) show that provision of need-based scholarships in 
France led to a 5% to 7% increase in university admittance.  
With the exception of the last study, previous research focused on educational 
achievements during primary and secondary education, whereas our research evaluates the 
impact of cash transfers on enrollment in post-secondary education. Moreover, while most of the 
above studies have reported positive effects of conditional cash transfers on scholarly 
achievements, the Georgian transfers were entirely unconditional on anything other than 
household poverty. Furthermore, unlike previous cash transfer programs which targeted specific 
groups such as micro-entrepreneurs (Blattman, Fiala, & Martinez, 2014), orphans (The Kenya 
CT-OVC Evaluation Team 2012), pensioners (Duflo, 2003), and students (Barrera-Osorio, 
Bertrand, Linden, & Perez-Calle, 2008; Fack & Grenet, 2015), the Georgian cash transfer 
program was not directed towards any particular social or age group. 
Finally, studies of the impact of family income on teenage/child development and 
scholastic achievements generally face an income endogeneity problem. The previous literature 
mostly employs randomized experiments that offer very strong internal validity. However, they 
typically do not consider long-term outcomes and are based on relatively small sample sizes. 
Observational studies thus have a useful role to play in complementing evidence from field 
experiments. Using regression discontinuity design in program evaluation is still very rare (Duflo 
& Kremer, 2005; Ravallion, 2007). In order to separately identify the effects attributed to 
additional income from those of other unobserved characteristics, it is important to study the 
impact of exogenous variation in family income with a credible methodology such as the 
regression discontinuity design (Lee and Lemieux 2010). 
 
1.2 The Targeted Social Assistance Program in Georgia 
 
The dataset on Georgia’s poor households was obtained from the Social Service Agency 
(SSA) affiliated with the Ministry of Labor, Health and Social Assistance. The agency collects 
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national and regional data as a part of the system of means testing of households that apply for 
the targeted social assistance program (SAP). After a household applies, a trained interviewer 
employed by the SSA visits a household, inspects its living standards, interviews its members, 
and completes a special questionnaire. Then the agency processes the information obtained and 
assigns a corresponding poverty score to the household (based on a logarithmic sums 
methodology).  The formula of the family score assessment combines all kinds of indices with 
different weights according to priority; see Formula 1.A.1 in appendix 1.A. Families with a 
poverty score below a 52,000 cut-off point were eligible for assistance from April 2005 until 
March 2008, when the cut-off point exogenously changed to 57,000.1 By February 2010, more 
than half a million households (over 40% of Georgia’s population) had applied and been 
assessed by the SSA. The amount of cash transferred monthly to the average household 
(composed of four members), is set proportionally to the average household’s subsistence level. 
Table 1.A1 in appendix 1.A displays the average amounts of monthly transfers and subsistence 
levels over the 2005–2010 period in USD, adjusted by PPP. The average monthly transfer 
amount is 46 USD and the average subsistence level is 118 USD. Thus, financial aid comprises 
at least 39 percent of the subsistence level income and it comes with no tax obligations attached. 
 
 
1.3 The Georgian University Admission System 
 
University admittance data was acquired from the National Assessment and Examination 
Center (NAEC), affiliated with Georgia’s Ministry of Education and Science, in order to link the 
SAP to an education outcome. The NAEC collects data on student admissions, annual entry 
examinations and scholarship allocations related to accredited universities in Georgia. Since the 
2005 reform, recent secondary school graduates who wish to enter university take mandatory 
exams (standardized tests) in general skills, Georgian language, a foreign language, and in a 
                                                 
 
1 The cut-off point thereafter remained at 57,000 points throughout the remainder of the program. 
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fourth subject corresponding to the student’s specialization. According to UNESCO data2 (see 
table 1.A2 in appendix 1.A), Georgia, relative to other countries in transition, enjoyed high 
enrollment rates in the late 90s. Admittance peaked in 2005 as the gross enrollment ratio reached 
about 47%. However, university attendance fell rapidly in subsequent years and in 2010 only 
28% of the university-aged population was enrolled in higher education. In the households 
designated as ‘poor’ in our data, the enrollment rates average only 12.7%, far below the national 
rates. It is generally accepted that the major cause of the sudden and significant decrease in the 
university enrollment ratio in Georgia was a direct effect of the university accreditation process, 
which started in 2005, and imposed a lowered number of available seats at Georgian universities. 
In 2005, Georgia introduced a centralized university admissions model that uses the 
NAEC applicant test scores as the sole criterion by which students may gain admission to the 
strictly limited number of allocated University seats (both public and private), the number of 
which is set by the government through institutional accreditation regulations. Moreover, the 
NAEC entrance exams are also the sole criterion for tuition grant allocation. For both admissions 
and scholarships, this model removes all personal and school-level achievements as well as 
demographic considerations from the selection criteria. Furthermore, only a small amount of 
public finances were allocated towards tuition grants throughout the period of this study. For 
example, in 2005 – 2009, only 40% of newly admitted students received any public funding 
whatsoever and only 9% received a scholarship that covered their full tuition costs (NAEC, 
2009a). Notably, private or NGO scholarships in Georgia are and were nearly non-existent.  
Since this model of admissions stringently covers all publically available financial 
assistance for university students, then the only major difference, between public and private 
university tuitions are rates. For example, in 2009, whereas public universities were not allowed 
to charge more than $1350 per year, one of the most prestigious private universities charged 
$8900. Ministry of Education (2009a) data shows that in 2007 – 2008, 72% of tertiary education 
students were enrolled at public Universities. The World Bank (2010) reports that the overall 
mean tuition for Georgian universities in 2006 – 2009 was about $1180. Therefore, the SSA 
targeted social assistance program, with an average unconditional monthly payout of $46 ($552 
                                                 
 
2 The statistics we report are a gross enrollment ratio, which is a share of enrolled students of the total number of 
people at the university age (18-23). 
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annually; which constitutes nearly half of the mean tuition), could considerably relax credit 
constraints for tertiary education in Georgia. 
1.4 Combined Dataset 
 
In order to identify whether or not and how much the unconditional cash transfers may 
have affected university enrollment amongst the poor who received the transfers, two main 
datasets were combined. The cash-transfer theoretical framework implies a couple main sub-
channels of how cash transfers may affect recipient enrollment in higher education. First, the 
higher budget could result in increased subsistence, spending on education, and increased (time 
and capital) investment into human capital accumulation, which could benefit children of all ages 
and could lead them to enrollment in tertiary education. Second, the direct relaxation of credit 
constraints may increase the ability of recent graduates of secondary school to be able to afford 
the costs associated with higher education. The latter is the case being investigated herein. 
Based on the identifying characteristics (Surname, Name, and Birth Date) of common 
observations, the following two datasets were merged to obtain a conjoined cross-sectional 
sample of candidates for university applications from 2007 to 2013. The datasets were merged 
such that the treatment and control groups are well defined around the change from the initial 
poverty cut-off point (52000) to the increased poverty cut-off point (57000).  
The first dataset (hereinafter referred to as “pre-modification”) is made up of 
observations about university applicants that come from families assessed by the SSA before the 
threshold modification in March, 2008. In contrast, the second dataset (hereinafter referred to as 
“post-modification”) includes applicants from those families that were assessed after the 
threshold modification. To evaluate the program’s effect, the treatment group consists of 
university students that began their studies after at least one year after their families began 
receiving the cash transfers. Table 1.A3 in appendix 1.A demonstrates the quantitative 
distribution of applicants from SSA families. Numbers in bold refer to those candidates whose 
families were assessed by the SSA at least one year before the university entry examination. The 
remaining numbers refer to placebo candidates who took the university entry examination before 
the SSA assessed their families and assigned scores.     
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1.5 Methodology and results 
 
Several interesting facts emerge from an initial inspection of the data. First, we see that 
overall, enrolled students come from wealthier families and the difference is strongly statistically 
significant (Average family poverty scores of enrolled and no-enrolled students are around 
80000 and 78000 respectively).3 
However, when poverty scores of enrolled and non-enrolled students are plotted over 
time, there is a significant drop in average poverty from 2007 to 2009 followed by a consistently 
small gap throughout 2013 (see Figure 1.1), meaning that relatively more applicants from poorer 
families were able to enroll in universities. 
Figure 1.1  Average family poverty score by student enrollment status over time  
 
This evidence suggests that two years after its introduction, the SSA made higher education 
relatively more affordable for students from poor households. Moreover, throughout the 
timeframe of this study, there were no other significant changes to tertiary education conditions 
for students, their families, or the associated communities in Georgia from 2005, when the 
national tertiary education admission system underwent a policy change. 
We also disaggregate poverty score time series by gender and enrollment status.  Figure 1.2 
shows that there was initially a large decline in average household poverty scores for enrolled 
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females, which leveled off in 2009, while the declining trend in household poverty scores for 
enrolled males occurred more steadily. 
Figure 1.2  Average family poverty score by enrolled student gender over time 
 
Interestingly, according to Figure 1.3, the decline in average household poverty scores for 
non-enrolled females was equally dramatic, while the decrease in household poverty scores for 
non-enrolled males was less significant—an indication of a gender specific effect of cash 
transfers on university enrollment. 
Figure 1.3  Average family poverty score by not enrolled student gender over time 
 
These findings call for further investigation of a causal impact of SAP on students’ chances of 
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An assessment of the causal inference (average treatment effect) of the social assistance 
program on university enrollment can be achieved using a parametric regression discontinuity 
design (polynomial regression, so-called global strategy estimation) because the density of the 
assignment variable—university enrollment—is discontinuous, while the covariates are not 
statistically different close to the threshold. To implement RDD analysis on the conjoined 
dataset, we first go through an inspection of covariates around the cut-off point. Covariates such 
as gender, age, and number of siblings do not seem to be statistically different in the 5000- and 
1000-bin widths around the thresholds for neither the pre-modification dataset nor the post-
modification dataset.  
Sample of families with an SSA visit before March, 2008 (pre-modification dataset) with 
a 5000-bin bandwidth around the threshold. 
 5000 poverty score around the cut-off, sample size = 8709=(4893+13816) 
Covariates Treatment group Control group Difference t statistics 
Family size 4.69 4.99 -0.31 -10.71*** 
Number of siblings 1.61 1.62 -0.01 -0.26 
Age 15.32 15.28 0.04 1.05 
Male 0.51 0.50 0.01 0.20 
 
Sample of families with an SSA visit before March, 2008 (pre-modification dataset) with 
a 1000-bin bandwidth around the threshold. 
 1000 poverty score around the cut-off, sample size = 3560=(922+2638) 
Covariates Treatment group Control group Difference t statistics 
Family size 4.65 5.06 -0.41 -6.25*** 
Number of siblings 1.58 1.61 -0.03 -1.09 
Age 15.25 15.22 0.03 0.38 




Sample of families with an SSA visit after March, 2008 (post-modification dataset) with 
a 5000-bin bandwidth around the threshold. 
 5000 poverty score around the cut-off, sample size = 5783=(3262+ 2521) 
Covariates Treatment group Control group Difference t statistics 
Family size 4.64 4.49 0.15 3.60*** 
Number of siblings 1.73 1.68 0.06 3.00*** 
Age 13.15 13.19 -0.09 -1.57 
Male 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.01 
 
Sample of families with an SSA visit after March, 2008 (post-modification dataset) with 
a 1000-bin bandwidth around the threshold. 
 1000 poverty score around the cut-off, sample size = 1158=(647+511) 
Covariates Treatment group Control group Difference t statistics 
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Family size 4.43 4.48 -0.05 -0.60 
Number of siblings 1.66 1.59 0.07 1.80* 
Age 13.17 13.08 0.09 0.70 
Male 0.53 0.56 -0.03 -0.88 
 
As the basic means comparison test (t-test) suggested, only household size (either total 
family size or number of siblings) amongst the covariates is systematically different over the 
treatment status between the pre- and post-modification samples. Moreover, when the RDD 
regression with all covariates as dependent variables is run, the results show that the household 
size is significantly greater for the control group, in the amount of 0.1 and 0.04 larger families 
for the pre- and post-modification data sets. F statistics are reported in appendix B. In addition, 
we have constructed outcome, rating, and covariate variable graphs for both samples. There is a 
clear sign of discontinuity in the case of average admissions and continuity amongst the 
covariates; see appendix 1.A, Figures 1.A.1–1.A6.  
According to Figure 1.A3, we observe the discontinuity in the density of the rating 
variable at the threshold (57,000) for the pre-modification dataset. We do not have an 
explanation why this might be the case. Therefore, it could be argued that the allocation of cash 
transfers may not have been random and this may be a limitation of the study. However, this 
particular feature of the data does not drive our results. This is because according to Figure 
1.A.6, the density of the rating variable is continuous at the cutoff point (52000) for the post-
modification dataset and has a positive and significant effect (larger in size relative to the effect 
from the pre-modification dataset) of cash transfers on the enrollment. Moreover, there is a 
discontinuity in the density of the family score variable around 57000 in the pre-modification 
dataset. That is, the discontinuity around 57000 was present before 2008 when the cutoff point 
was 52000, and therefore this might be a particular characteristic of the data unrelated to the 
allocation rule of the cash transfers to the recipients.  Furthermore, a difference-in-differences 
RDD did not show any significant result for either the full sample or just for males, which means 
that there is no statistically significant difference between the effects of the program for pre- and 
post-modification data.  Therefore, the standard RDD approach used below is neither conflating 
nor concealing any natural effect phenomenon occurring at the 57000 point threshold and it 




The polynomial model, where the framework includes the entire dataset in the analysis, is 
as follows:  
𝑒𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑝𝑖 + 𝛾𝑃
(𝑛)(𝑠𝑖 − 𝑇) + 𝛿𝑃
(𝑛)(𝑠𝑖 − 𝑇)𝑝𝑖 + 𝜃𝑋𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖,          (1) 
where the binary outcome variable 𝑒𝑖 stands for university enrollment, while the dummy variable 
𝑝𝑖 is one if the family is a program recipient and zero otherwise. Other explanatory parts are 𝑛th 
order polynomials of the distance between the poverty score (𝑠𝑖) and the threshold (𝑇) as well as 
for the interaction term, and 𝑋𝑖 are the relevant individual covariates.  
In order to specify the model or degree of the polynomial terms correctly using a 
parametric model, we go through a three-step procedure separately for both datasets. The first 
step is a visual inspection of the average outcome values over the poverty score variable and a 
formal test of the selection of an appropriate bin width. After choosing the optimal bin sizes, the 
second step is to identify the polynomial degrees. We use the methodology of Lee and Lemieux 
(2010) for the model selection criterion. Finally, we conduct a sensitivity analysis (robustness 
checks) that shows that the treatment estimates do not vary much after the outermost 
observations are dropped, when we iteratively censor both tails of the distribution of the data at 
1%, 5%, and 10%. 
By dividing intervals into equal sub-intervals up to the point when the next step brings no 
explanatory power to the outcome variable, the resulting most appropriate bin size is a poverty 
score of 500. Specifically, the corresponding F-statistic is no longer statistically significant at the 
95% confidence level; see table 1.B1 in appendix 1.B. Table 1.B2 in appendix 1.B illustrates the 
model selection criterion. Comparing a linear model to higher order polynomial specifications 
for the pre-modification dataset, F-test values suggest that a first order (linear) model with 
interaction terms and covariates fits best from amongst all options; see table 1.B2 in appendix 
1.B. Finally, we perform a sensitivity analysis where we show that our model is not sensitive to 
the dropping of the outermost points from the data and the results are stable across all possible 
sub-samples; see table 1.B3 in appendix 1.B. 
Based on the three-step procedure above, it was decided that the pre-modification 
model’s specification would be a parametric model with first-degree polynomial terms with 
interactions and covariates. Our main findings, shown in Table 1.1 below, clearly suggest that 
being a member of a beneficiary family significantly increases chances of enrollment in 
university, by an average of 0.8 percentage points. Since the sample mean of enrollment in our 
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sample is 12.7%, the effect size of cash transfers on university enrollment is 6.3% (0.8%/12.7%). 
Furthermore, the gender-based interaction term (column 2b, labeled “Gender gap”) indicates that 




The Impact of the Social Assistance Program on University Enrollment First–degree, 
Polynomial Regressions: Pre-Modification Dataset 
 
 Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3 
Enrollment to 
university 















    .008**     .017*** -.005 -.003 .0073  .015* .011 .024 
(.004) (.006) (.007) (.005) (.006) (.008) (.016) (.021) 
Interaction 
term * Male 
dummy 
- - -   .015* - - - - 
- - - (.005) - - - - 
Mean  .127 .115 .141 .127 .126 .115 .125 .129 
# observations 61150 31183 29967 61150 38217 19393 6924 3574 
𝑅2 0.0021 0.0008 0.0014 0.0034 0.0017 0.0010 0.0052 0.0025 
Notes:  Coefficients in all columns are OLS regression estimates, robust standard errors are in parentheses; ***, **, 
and * indicates significance at 5%, 10% and 1% level, respectively. Samples 1, 2 and 3 are households (candidate 
applicants) with the entry examination at least one year later than the family assessment period. The second sample 
focuses on large families (more than 3 members) and the third subsample considers only households located in the 
capital city of Georgia. Furthermore, cohort and entry-year fixed effects and covariates (household size and gender) 
are considered in the regressions. Interaction term is a multiplication of male and beneficiary indicator variables.  
 
A similar analysis was performed for the post-modification dataset. Based on the three–
step procedure (see tables 1.B4, 1.B5 and 1.B6 in appendix 1.B), it was decided that the model’s 
specification will be a parametric model with second–degree4 polynomial (quadratic) terms with 
interactions and covariates. According to Table 1.2, the effect size in this case is 11% 
(1.4%/12.7%) and 18.1% (2.3%/12.7%) for males. 
 
                                                 
 
4 The model specification for the post-modification dataset is different from the model specification for the pre-
modification dataset. This is because model specifications in each case are optimized through the three-step 
procedure Lee and Lemieux (2010). Moreover, the pre-modification and post-modification datasets are not identical 
as they are distant in time and Lee and Lemieux (2010). Moreover, pre-modification and post-modification datasets 
are not identical as they are distinct in time and have different cutoff points for poverty score and these may, in 






The Impact of the Social Assistance Program on University Enrollment Second–Degree 
Polynomial Regressions: Post-Modification Dataset 
 
 Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3 
Enrollment to 
university 















   .014*    .023* .016 .008 .021** .022* -.017 -.012 
(.007) (.011) (.013) (.012) (.009) (.012) (.021) (.029) 
Interaction 
term 
- - - .004 - - - - 
- - - (.006) - - - - 
Mean  .117 .127               .128 .117 .115                  .106                .141               .136 
# observations 71132 34378 36754 71132 50129 25960 11286 5802 
𝑅2 0.0025 0.0027 0.0036 0.004 0.0027 0.0057 0.0049 0.0077 
Notes:  Coefficients in all columns are OLS regression estimates, robust standard errors are in parentheses; **, and * 
indicates significance at 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Sample definitions are the same as in the previous table. 
Samples 1, 2 and 3 are households (candidate applicants) with the entry examination at least one year later than the 
family assessment period. The second sample focuses on large families (more than 3 members) and the third 
subsample considers only households located in the capital city of Georgia. Furthermore, cohort and entry-year fixed 
effects and covariates (household size and gender) are considered in the regressions. Interaction term is a 
multiplication of male and beneficiary indicator variables.  
 
Thus far, it has been shown that there is a statistically significant effect from the 
unconditional cash transfer program in Georgia on university enrollment. A placebo test, which 
examines the effects at the cut-off in the year before the social assistance program started, was 
run in order to test the robustness of the validity of the regression outcomes. For both data sets 
there is no effect of the program on university enrollment. In particular, we obtain negative 
coefficient estimates (-0.01% and -2.1%) and they are not statistically significant. Therefore, the 
results are, in this way, confirmed as robust.     
In light of the recently published study by Fack & Grenet, (2015) that reports up to a 7% 
increase in university enrollment as a result of 1500 Euro need-based scholarships allocated to 
potential students in France, the effects of the Georgian cash assistance program are particularly 
notable. First of all, unlike in France, cash transfers in Georgia were unconditional. Second, the 
amount of cash transfers to Georgian households, which averaged 46 USD and never exceeded 
100 USD for the average beneficiary family, is minuscule relative to the need-based scholarships 
granted to students in France. Even when multiplying the figure by the average differences in 
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PPP (2.45) and median income (9.22 times higher in France) between the two countries for the 
2007–2013 period, the average Georgian cash transfer amounts to 1039 USD for an entire 
household. Arguably, the Georgian cash transfer was thus considerably more effective compared 
to the 1500 EUR (or about 1875 USD during that period) per French student.5 
 
 
1.6 Heterogeneity Analysis 
 
In this section, we extend our analysis and explore whether and how a family’s 
composition moderates the observed effect. First of all, we are interested in whether the observed 
effect is gender specific. Gender preferences have been significantly and positively linked with 
education spending on the children of the preferred gender in Korea (Choi & Hwang, 2015) and 
the US (Behrman, Rosenzweig, & Taubman, 1996). Moreover, even the number of years, focus, 
and attainment of education has been associated with gender preference (Choi and Hwang, 2015 
and Behrman, Rosenzweig, & Taubman, 1996). In line with these results, our findings show that 
cash transfers significantly increase the odds of university enrollment for males. According to 
Table 1.1 above, in the column males only, the program’s effect for males against the average is 
an increase of 13.4% (18.1% in the post-modification dataset; from Table 1.2). This may echo 
reported gender specific preferences (biased towards males) of parents in South Caucasian 
countries (King, Guo, McKee, Richardson, and Stuckler, 2013). In consequence, while cash 
transfers increase overall university enrollment rates in Georgia, they may also widen the gender 
gap in education. 
Further, there is strong evidence in other areas of economic research that shows how birth 
order affects child outcomes. For example, Devereux, Salvanes, and Black (2005) find a strong 
and significant negative effect of birth order on children's education, employment, wages, and 
even teenage childbearing. Dohmen, Falk, Huffman and Sunde (2011) investigate the 
intergenerational transmission of risk and trust attitudes as a result of parental socialization 
                                                 
 
5 Sourced from the OECD website (oecd.org) in 2016. 
18 
 
efforts. They find that first–born children are usually more similar to their parents in terms of 
risk and trust preferences. To explain the findings, the authors maintain that socialization is a 
result of parental effort, which seems to be stronger for oldest children. In line with the literature 
noted, we observe that the impact of cash transfers on university enrollment is stronger for the 
oldest children in a family; see column 3 in the Tables above. This finding is also a direct 
implication of the quantity-quality tradeoff paradigm formulated by Becker (Becker & Lewis, 
1973). Alternatively, it is consistent with a family participation model in which parental 
investments in older children not only pays back to the parents later in life, but already includes 
contributions towards the households in young adulthood, including towards the education costs 
of younger siblings. Column 4 in the Table above shows that this birth order effect is even 
stronger when the oldest child is male, consistent with the above-mentioned observations. 
Finally, we check whether the effect differs across the geographical locations of the 
program’s recipients. One might argue that the program is more likely to increase the chance of 
enrollment for those students who live in the capital city of Georgia (Tbilisi) and has less impact 
on university enrollees in the regions. Surprisingly, the Tbilisi coefficient has a negative sign, 
although it is not statistically significant. Still, this combined with the following reported 
findings may suggest that university education is costlier for students from the more rural 
regions.  
Evidently, one factor distorting educational choices is distance (Griffith & Rothstein, 
2009). The applicants most likely to be deterred from applying to high-ranking universities by 
the distance factor are low income (Turley, 2009) and those from rural areas (Chanqseliani, 
2013). The distance factor in the Georgian context is reinforced by the fact that universities do 
not offer student accommodation or support for living expenses, and financing student life per 
academic year in Tbilisi would cost an average rural adult three years of income (Chanqseliani, 
2013). As a result, according to Chanqseliani (2013), rural applicants are 12 times less likely to 
apply to prestigious universities, most of which are located in Tbilisi.6 Therefore, allocation of 
regional talent is biased towards less prestigious and peripheral universities. 
 
                                                 
 
6According to Chanqseliani (2013), the ranking of the universities is based on the average United National 
Examination scores of the student cohort. According to this measure of university quality, 100% of the highest, 
second highest and medium quality universities are located in Tbilisi. 65% of the lowest quality universities are 




1.7 Discussion and Conclusion 
 
This paper investigates the impact of unconditional cash transfers in Georgia on 
university enrollment. The program selects recipients based upon a quantitative poverty 
threshold, which gives us the ability to implement a regression discontinuity approach. We use 
the data on program recipients from the SSA and on university admissions from the NAEC and 
combine these into a single dataset. First of all, we observe that the enrollment rate in the sample 
of poorest Georgian households is very low relative to the national average. We find that being a 
recipient in the program significantly increases a student’s likelihood of university enrollment, 
by 6.3%. In comparison, Fack and Grenet (2015) report up to a 7% increase in university 
enrollment as a result of 1500 Euro need-based scholarships allocated to potential university 
students in France. The large effects of cash transfers on enrollment rates in Georgia are 
particularly notable. First of all, unlike in France, cash transfers in Georgia were unconditional. 
Second, the amount of cash transfers to Georgian households, which averaged 46 US dollars for 
an average family, was notably smaller relative to the 1500 Euro scholarships in France, even 
when adjusting for PPP and median income differences.  
If unconditional transfers have such a strong impact on university enrollment by poor 
students, then the Georgian government may want to consider further complementary approaches 
to nudge the poor to invest in skills and education; which may help break the poverty cycle. 
Furthermore, politicians might also opt for conditional transfer programs, such as need-based 
university scholarships that could encourage students from poor family backgrounds to continue 
their education. Such measures could reduce the pressure to leave the educational system and 
start working early with low education levels and correspondingly low productivity and income 
levels. In fact, such conditional programs could have an even greater positive effect upon 
education outcomes than the unconditional transfers. 
We also find a gender specific effect. While cash transfers increase overall university 
enrollment rates in Georgia, the effect for males is much stronger than the average effect (13.4% 
vs. 6.3% in the pre-modification findings and 18.1% vs. 11% in the post-modification findings). 
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Our findings echo previously reported gender specific effects of education (Choi and Hwang, 
2015 and Behrman, Rosenzweig, & Taubman, 1996). We also observe that the impact of cash 
transfers on university enrollment is stronger for the oldest children in a family. This finding is in 
line with the quantity-quality tradeoff paradigm formulated by Becker (Becker & Lewis, 1973).  
Finally, as noted, the negative coefficient on Tbilisi may be an indication that cash 
transfers most effectively help students from rural regions, as the costs of higher education are 
greater for these applicants. Previous literature is rich with examples of when the sorting of 
students and universities according to prestige considerations has a very significant effect on 
educational outcomes, occupations, earnings, and, consequently, social mobility (Behrman, 
Rosenzweig, & Taubman, 1996; Brewer, Eide, & Ehrenberg, 1999; Carnevale& Rose, 2003; Li, 
Meng, Shi, & Wu, 2012). The misallocation of regional talent may in turn adversely impact the 
overall quality of education and heighten the current skills mismatch in the labor sector7 in 
Georgia. Effectively, this would likely lessen the productivity of workers and ultimately generate 
some degree of welfare loss. Therefore, this study should encourage policy aimed at increasing 
education outcomes, taking into account gender and location heterogeneity.  
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Formula 1.A1: The Family Score Assessment methodology is based on the logarithmic sums 
principle that considers different weights according to the priority. 𝐾𝑖,𝑗refers to the weights and 
𝑌𝑖,𝑗 to survey responses.  
Poverty score 
(made up of variables below) 
 
Welfare index  
Household consumption index  
Agricultural index (land)  
Agricultural index (livestock)  
Non-agricultural index  
Income index  
Demographic index  





Other possessions index 
 
Family adult members index 
 






Table 1.A1: Amount of cash transferred monthly to the average household in PPP adjusted 











2005 16.5 6.6 36.4 501.8 88.7 
2006 16.9 6.8 37.1 774.6 100.6 
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2008 20.1 8.1 44.3 973.7 144 
2009 18 14.4 61.1 818.4 129.3 
2010 16.8 13.5 57.2 874.3 126.4 
2011 17.8 14.2 60.5 1076.9 156.9 
2012 18.2 14.5 61.8 1174.5 153.5 
Table 1.A2: Gross enrollment rates for countries in transition. 
 
GROSS ENROLLMENT RATIO, TERTIARY, BOTH SEXES (%): 1999-2010 
  1999-2005 2005-2010 1999-2010 










































Romania 21.63 44.90 107.59 Romania 56.77 26.44 162.48 
Kazakhstan 24.93 52.92 112.24 Kazakhstan 39.49 -25.37 58.38 
Czech Rep. 25.56 48.90 91.32 Czech Rep. 63.21 29.24 147.27 
Macedonia 21.77 29.63 36.07 Macedonia 37.07 25.12 70.26 
Mongolia 26.91 44.65 65.93 Mongolia 53.81 20.49 99.95 
Slovakia 25.94 40.39 55.66 Slovakia 55.99 38.61 115.78 
Kyrgyzstan 29.16 42.53 45.82 Kyrgyzstan 42.13 -0.94 44.44 
Tajikistan 17.44 20.96 20.14 Tajikistan 22.69 8.27 30.08 
Armenia 34.62 38.36 10.82 Armenia 50.62 31.94 46.22 
Uzbekistan 12.50 9.85 -20.88 Uzbekistan 9.94* 0.91 -20.48 




























Hungary 32.49 65.10 100.33 Hungary 60.37 -7.26 85.78 
Lithuania 44.01 77.50 76.10 Lithuania 80.75 4.18 83.47 
Slovenia 52.35 79.70 34.31 Slovenia 88.46 10.99 68.97 
Latvia 50.90 78.85 54.90 Latvia 70.55 -10.53 38.59 
Croatia 30.55 44.53 45.74 Croatia 55.83 25.37 82.73 
Ukraine 47.10 68.66 45.78 Ukraine 76.65 11.63 62.74 
Poland 45.43 63.60 39.97 Poland 73.52 15.59 61.80 
Russia 51.44 72.59 41.09 Russia 75.89 4.54 47.53 
Estonia 51.12 68.44 33.89 Estonia 71.65 4.68 40.16 
Georgia 35.70 46.60 30.51 Georgia 28.26 -39.34 -20.84 
Belarus 52.11 66.16 26.96 Belarus 78.99 19.38 51.56 
Moldova 32.69 36.09 10.40 Moldova 38.14 5.67 16.67 
Bulgaria 45.20 44.27 -2.05 Bulgaria 57.99 30.99 28.29 
 
Table 1.A3: Quantitative distribution of candidate applicants (ready for higher education) from 
SSA families, where numbers in bold refer to those candidates whose families were assessed 
before the entry examination year 
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 Family assessment 
year (by SSA) 
University entry Examination Year 
 






 2005 842 943 746 658 584 527 531 4831 
2006 5582 6051 5,599 4904 4564 4579 4476 35755 






 2008 6803 6460 5863 5735 5727 6024 5771 42383 
2009 10497 11081 9668 8778 9259 9346 9530 68159 
2010 718 753 703 644 602 608 565 4593 
 
Total 28478 29706 27004 24824 24601 25008 24748 184369 
 
Enrollment 
        
 
no 25165 26913 23687 22109 21564 21708 21318 162464 
 
yes 3313 2793 3317 2715 3037 3300 3430 21905 
 
% enrollment 12% 9% 12% 11% 12% 13% 14% 12% 
          
 
NAEC 15599 14159 25153 19749 23204 24495 27097 149456 
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Figure 1.A2: (Pre-Modification Dataset) – Average enrollment rate across bins.  
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Figure 1.A4: (Post-Modification Dataset) – Distribution of the covariates (Family size, age, 
gender). 
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Step 1 – Bin size selection criteria, F–test 
 
Bin size Restricted 𝑅2 Unrestricted 𝑅2 # of bins Observations F value 
10000 0.0007 0.0009 19 105377 1.11 
5000 0.0009 0.0013 39 105377 1.08 
2000 0.0013 0.0023 99 105377 1.07 
1000 0.0023 0.0043 199 105377 1.06 
500* 0.0043 0.0081 399 105377 1.01* 
200 0.0115 0.0213 999 105377 1 
100 0.0213 0.0411 1999 105377 1 





Step 2 – Model specification, F–test 
 
Model specification no covariates Estimate St. Error t value F - Value 
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Linear interaction* model 2 0.00917 0.0048 1.92 0.904* 
Quadratic model 3 0.00710 0.0050 1.41 0.904 
Quadratic interaction model 4 0.00942 0.0068 1.38 0.904 
Cubic model 5 0.00629 0.0050 1.24 0.905 
Cubic interaction model 6 0.01033 0.0089 1.16 0.904 
4th degree model 7 0.00535 0.0059 0.91 0.903 
4th degree interaction model 8 0.01823 0.0109 1.66 0.888 
5th degree  model 9 0.00751 0.0063 1.19 0.903 
5th degree interaction model 10 0.01615 0.0114 1.41 0.904 
 
 
with   covariates 
    Linear model 1 0.00308 0.0041 0.75 1.06 
Linear interaction* model 2 0.00775 0.0046 1.69 0.89* 
Quadratic model 3 0.00554 0.0050 1.10 0.90 
Quadratic interaction model 4 0.00841 0.0068 1.24 0.89 
Cubic model 5 0.00486 0.0051 0.96 0.90 
Cubic interaction model 6 0.00915 0.0089 1.03 0.89 
4th degree model 7 0.00408 0.0059 0.69 0.90 
4th degree interaction model 8 0.01663 0.0109 1.52 0.90 
5th degree  model 9 0.00637 0.0063 1.01 0.90 
5th degree interaction model 10 0.01460 0.0114 1.28 0.90 
Table 1.B3 
Step 3 – Robustness checks, comparisons of estimates under three levels of outermost point 
dropouts 
 
Dropping outliers  Treatment estimates Standard Errors t value 
Dropping outermost 1%  0.009 0.005 1.80 
with covariates 0.008 0.005 1.52 
Dropping outermost 5%  0.006 0.005 1.08 
with covariates 0.005 0.005 0.89 
Dropping outermost 10%  0.008 0.006 1.35 




Step 1 – Bin size selection criteria, F–test 
 
Bin size Restricted 𝑅2 Unrestricted 𝑅2 # of bins Observations F value 
10000 0.0008 0.0012 19 75532 1.59 
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5000 0.0012 0.0018 39 75532 1.16 
2000 0.0019 0.0034 99 75532 1.14 
1000 0.0034 0.0061 199 75532 1.03 
500* 0.0061 0.0113 399 75532 0.99* 
200 0.0142 0.0265 999 75532 0.94 
100 0.0265 0.0502 1999 75532 0.92 





Step 2 – Model specification, F–test 
Model specification 
no 
covariates Estimate St. Error t value F value 
Linear model 1 0.0037 0.0040 0.92 1.06 
Linear interaction model 2 0.0121 0.0055 2.19 1.04 
Quadratic model 3 0.0021 0.0054 0.39 1.00 
Quadratic interaction* model 4 0.0135 0.0071 1.87 1.00* 
Cubic model 5 0.0027 0.0063 0.44 1.00 
Cubic interaction model 6 0.0010 0.0101 0.1 1.00 
4th degree model 7 0.0017 0.0063 0.27 1.00 
4th degree interaction model 8 -0.0044 0.0124 -0.35 1.00 
5th degree  model 9 0.0048 0.0071 0.68 1.00 




    Linear model 1 0.0037 0.0040 0.93 1.06 
Linear interaction model 2 0.0118 0.0055 2.14 1.04 
Quadratic model 3 -0.0021 0.0054 -0.38 1.01 
Quadratic interaction* model 4 0.0092 0.0078 1.17 1.00 
Cubic model 5 0.0027 0.0063 0.44 1.01 
Cubic interaction model 6 0.0010 0.0101 0.1 1.01 
4th degree model 7 0.0017 0.0063 0.27 1.02 
4th degree interaction model 8 -0.0041 0.0124 -0.33 1.01 
5th degree  model 9 0.0049 0.0071 0.68 1.01 





Step 3 – Robustness checks, comparisons of estimates for three levels of outermost point 
dropouts 
 
Treatment estimates Standard Errors t value 
Dropping outermost 1%  0.014 0.006 2.30 
with covariates 0.013 0.006 2.23 
Dropping outermost 5%  0.012 0.007 1.67 
with covariates 0.012 0.007 1.64 
Dropping outermost 10%  0.016 0.010 1.60 



























Chapter 2: Can Unconditional Cash Transfers Make 
Recipients Worse Off? Evaluating a social assistance 
program in Georgia 
 
 




Cash transfers to the poor have become a cornerstone of social policy in developing 
countries. Following the success of Progresa/Oportunidadesa in Mexico and Bolsa Familia in 
Brazil, many countries have adopted similar schemes (Barrientos and Hulme 2009). 
Correspondingly, a large literature has developed to evaluate the impact of cash transfers on 
recipient outcomes (for a review see Arnold, Conway, and Greenslade. 2011). 
Elementary microeconomics suggests that cash transfers should lead to an increase of 
some combination of consumption and investment. The extra income from the cash transfer 
program could affect their overall income in two directions. First, the extra money necessarily 
increases total income from the start. The additional ability to spend can be spent on direct 
consumption or into productive investments, such as household or small business production. 
Second, the extra money can reduce earned income through the income effect. Labor supply of 
the household could thus be reduced, as the household would not need to work as much to earn 
as much as they had before. Alternatively, the added income could cause a preference shift such 
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that the household would want to work even more to have even greater consumption ability to 
accompany their increased social mobility. Throughout all the standard cases described above, it 
is almost axiomatic that a cash transfer program would increase the consumption of recipients. 
Certainly, this has been consistently supported by all studies that have examined effects of cash 
transfers on consumption (Attanasio & Mesnard 2006, Gertler et al. 2012).  
More interestingly, recent literature has begun focusing more upon what type of 
consumption is increased (see e.g. Attanasio et al. 2012, Evans & Popova 2014). The distribution 
and level of spending would certainly be an outcome of the total income of the household, but it 
would likely remain the same if the household reduces their labor supply, or would increase in 
terms of consumption and/or investment if the household does not reduce their labor supply as 
much or even increases it. Increased consumption could take many forms according to utility 
preferences, but investment would most likely occur along the dimensions of durable goods, 
production capital, or human capital. 
In this paper, an original household survey and a regression discontinuity approach are 
employed to evaluate a Targeted Social Assistance program (unconditional cash transfer) in 
Georgia. It is found that receiving the transfers leads to a worsening in (self-reported) basic 
economic conditions, such as the ability to afford food. A number of possible mechanisms that 
explain this counterintuitive result are discussed in the text, including crowding out from other 
sources of income as well as dynamic changes in behaviors and preference due to relaxed budget 
constraints. However, the results which may be driven by respondent misreporting, clearly 
remain puzzling. 
To the best of our knowledge, there are just two other studies that evaluate the effect of 
the same program. Both focus on a relatively narrow set of outcomes. Abramishvili and 
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Lanchava (2015) find a positive effect of the program on university enrollment, while Kits et al. 
(2013) find that the program decreases the labor supply of women. Therefore, a major 
contribution of this research is the evaluation of this unconditional cash transfer program in 
Georgia on a wider set of outcomes that provide a much more comprehensive assessment of the 
multiple effects of the program. Another novel contribution to this program evaluation is the new 
data generated by the survey we created specifically for this purpose. In particular, the unique 
addition of subjective welfare indices–an uncommon feature of similar studies—that illuminates 
several new interesting effects. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 describes the targeted social assistance 
program in Georgia. Section 2.3 covers data and section 2.4 methodology. Section 2.5 presents 
the results and section 2.6 concludes. 
2.2 The Social Assistance Program in Georgia 
 
Poverty is a persistent problem in Georgia with 11.6% of the population living below the 
national poverty line. In 2005, the reformist government that was elected after the Rose 
Revolution in 2003 instituted a cash transfer program for the poor. Under the scheme, program 
recipients received an unconditional cash transfer of 30 GEL (around 18 USD) per month plus 
12 GEL (around 7 USD; later increased to 24 GEL) per household member beyond the first one. 
Hence, a household of two adults and two children enrolled in 2009 would receive 102 GEL 
(around 66 dollars) per month. 
Once enrolled in the program, recipients received cash transfers monthly and there were 
no conditions attached to the receipt of this governmental assistance. If the recipients' economic 
situation were to improve substantially, they were supposed to report the improvement to the 
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government agency and could lose the benefits. While only a few households exited the program 
in this manner, the prospect of losing the support may have influenced the household's behavior. 
To determine eligibility, applicants to the program were visited by government agents 
who asked a range of questions—from income health status to the condition of the applicant’s 
dwelling. The answers to these questions were then aggregated using a complex formula to 
produce a poverty score. Applicants whose score fell below a certain threshold were deemed 
eligible for support from the program, while all others were excluded. 
Rejected applicants could, in principle, apply in a subsequent year, but this occurred only 
rarely. In fact, the administrative data shows that less than 0.5% of households applied more than 
once. The vast majority of survey respondents who were above the poverty threshold (and hence 
ineligible) reported not receiving support from the program when interviewed five years later. As 
of 2015, 11.6% of the population received cash transfers.8 The program redistributed roughly 1% 
of GDP, which was equivalent to 3.3% of all public expenditure. 
2.3 Data 
 
We obtained data from the Social Service Agency (SSA) of Georgia covering the 
population of households applying to the program from its inception in 2005 to March 2010. The 
data from the SSA includes the household poverty score, the time of the visit by government 
agent, and the applicants' answers to a number of questions that enter into the poverty score 
calculation. To complement the SSA data, we designed a survey instrument to measure the 
                                                 
 
8 Our own calculation based upon social assistance data described below. 
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economic outcomes of the program. To a large extent, we re-used questions used in other 
surveys in Georgia. The survey questions are presented in appendix 2.A. 
An important choice was which households to survey. Since we were planning to analyze 
the program in a regression discontinuity framework, it was natural to sample households as 
close to the threshold as possible. While we were initially planning a nationally representative 
survey, the logistical difficulties of surveying households outside of the capital Tbilisi proved 
considerable. Given the limited resources at our disposal, we chose to focus on applicants from 
Tbilisi. We selected 901 households from the Tbilisi region who applied in 2009. Figure 2.1 
illustrates our sampling frame.  
 




We conducted our survey between October 2014 and March 2015, with a break in 
January and February 2015.9Research assistants contacted 901 households—including 451 
program eligible and 450 program ineligible households—and obtained 334 answers, for a 
response rate of 37.2%. The response rate was balanced across eligible (36.7%) and non-eligible 
respondents (37.4%). 
It is easily seen that the histogram density just around the threshold is not ideally flat.  
However, this does not indicate that there is successful participant manipulation, as that would be 
indicated by a jump in the density just below the threshold in order to obtain the social 
assistance. Therefore, it can be assumed that the rising density just around the threshold is a 
natural artifact of the data.  Moreover, the regression discontinuity equation employs different 
distance variable in order to assess if any unobservable effect is occurring in the data. 
In the survey, we explicitly asked whether respondents were program recipients in 2009 
(see the full survey instrument in Appendix 2.A). This enables us to compare self-reported 
recipient status with recipient status inferred from the poverty score in the administrative data 
(see table 2.1).  
Table 2.1: Self-reported recipient status in 2014 and 2009 eligibility threshold 
 Below eligibility threshold in 2009  
Yes No 
In 2014, reported 
receiving program in 
2009 
Yes 121 15 136 
No 38 160 198 
 159 175 334 
 
Of the respondents who were eligible for the program according to their 2009 poverty 
score, 76% reported receiving the program’s assistance at the time of survey. The remainder 
                                                 
 
9 The bulk of the data was collected in October and November 2014 
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could be due either to imperfect recall, unwillingness to disclose receiving of the program, 
recipient change of address, or exit from the program. Conversely, of the respondents who were 
not eligible for the program according to their 2009 poverty score, 91% reported not receiving 
the program as of 2014. The remaining 9% could be due to entry in the program at a subsequent 
date, incorrect answers of the respondent, or recipient change of address. Given that some level 
of noise can be expected from survey data, there seems to be a reasonably good concordance 
between eligibility inferred from administrative data and self-reported program recipient status. 
We use eligibility inferred from administrative data for the purpose of analysis.10 
2.4 Methodology 
 
To estimate the impact of the program, we implement a regression discontinuity design 
(RDD) approach. Specifically, we used the form: 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑖 + 𝑓(𝑆) + 𝑖                                                 (1) 
where 𝑌𝑖 is an outcome variable, 𝑇𝑖 is an indicator for being a program recipient (which 
corresponds to being below the eligibility threshold), and 𝑓(𝑆) is a polynomial function of the 
difference between the poverty score and the eligibility threshold. We use a polynomial of 
degree one (linearization), but allow for different slopes on both sides of the threshold. 
Provided that the assignment to the treatment is as good as random in the neighborhood 
of the eligibility threshold, this specification will give the local average treatment effect (LATE) 
of the program. An important provision for the interpretation of the results is that we do not 
estimate the average effect of the program, only the effect of the program close to the threshold. 
                                                 
 
10 This level of noise, which is expected from survey data, could mean that RDD is fuzzy in this case. However, the 





Table 2.2: Effect of the program on economic conditions 
 Program 
receipt 
 Mean of 
D.V.  
Money is not enough for food 0.297***  (0.106) 0.49 
Income in 2015 expected to be higher than in 2009 -0.217**  (0.084) 0.20 
Monthly income is below USD 100 per month 0.017  (0.104) 0.33 
Monthly income is below USD 250 per month 0.084  (0.105) 0.70 
Monthly spending is below USD 100 per month 0.023  (0.104) 0.32 
Monthly spending is below USD 250 per month 0.064  (0.104) 0.70 
Has savings -0.021  (0.020) 0.01 
Has debts -0.003  (0.107) 0.61 
Had to borrow money to pay for utilities 0.316**  (0.114) 0.38 
Had to borrow money to pay for food 0.158  (0.113) 0.53 
Rate of happiness -0.379  (0.621) 5.67 
Rate of satisfaction 0.093  (0.545) 4.38 
Rate of health -0.131  (0.225) 2.70 
Economic condition of the household  -0.037  (0.111) 0.42 
Household economic position in 10 ladders -0.518  (0.379) 3.44 
Share of household members employed -0.044  (0.037) 0.10 
Each line corresponds to a different regression with the dependent variable indicated in the 
first column. All regressions include linear distance to the threshold as control. N = 334. 
Standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01 
 
Table 2.2 displays results for a set of economic outcomes. Each line corresponds to a 
different regression with the relevant dependent variable indicated on the left. Program recipients 
are significantly more likely to describe their economic condition as “money is not enough for 
food". Also, program recipients are less likely to expect that their income in 2015 will be higher 
than in 2009. 
Visual representations of the results are provided below in figures 2.A1 and 2.A2. Please 
note that the dots on the graphs denote the percent of households within each bin that responded 
“yes” to the survey questions.  
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Figure 2.A1: Percent of households responding positively to the question "is your 




Figure 2.A2: Percent of households responding positively to the question "does your 
household not have enough money for food?" before and after the threshold 
 
The figures exhibit the unexpected results mentioned in the introduction, that program 
recipients expect to earn less on average in 2015 and believe more so, on average, that there is 
not enough money for food than their non-recipient counterparts. This may indicate a crowding 
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out effect or a dynamic change in preferences influenced in part by receiving or not receiving the 
cash transfers. Additional explanations of these results are discussed below.  
The table also displays the effect upon likelihood of level of income and spending, 
saving, and more. The income is measured inclusive of the program’s cash transfers, being 
below USD 100 per month or below USD 250 per month (exact income figures were not 
enquired about, only whether income and spending fell into one of six intervals). Being a 
recipient has no significant effect on most of these measures; though it may be worthwhile to 
note that, though insignificant, the point estimates correspond to a higher likelihood of lower 
income and spending post program participation. Program recipients are more likely to report 
that they have had to borrow to pay for utilities in the last six months, as well as having had to 
borrow to pay for food, although only the former is significant. There is virtually no difference 
between program recipients and the control group in terms of the likelihood of being in debt and 
the likelihood of having savings. The effect of program receipt on the rate of happiness, life 
satisfaction, self-reported health, and the perceived economic condition relative to non-recipient 
households is not significant.  

























Observations 331 329 328 330 330 329 
Distance Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mean of dependent 
variable 
0.20 0.52 0.67 0.81 0.81 0.69 


























Observations 329 327 324 328 305  
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Distance Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Mean of dependent 
variable 
0.40 0.25 0.64 0.65 0.65  
Standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01 
 
Inability to afford certain household items over the course of a typical month is further 
detailed in table 2.3. Program recipients are significantly more likely to answer that they have to 
limit their consumption of bread, milk, poultry, fish, vegetables, sweets, and chocolate due to the 
budget difficulties. For the other items we asked about (meat, pork, potatoes, electricity, gas), the 
effect of program recipients is not significant but the point estimates go in the same direction.  
 



















Observations 331 328 329 331 
Distance Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mean of dependent 
variable 






Land line phone 
(8) 
Cell phone 








Observations 329 329 328 330 
Distance Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mean of dependent 
variable 
0.02 0.15 0.59 0.74 
Standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01 
 
Lastly table 2.4 reports the effect of the program on ownership of certain durable items, 
including color televisions, digital cameras, washing machines, fridges, air conditioners, cars, 
landline phones, and cell phones. None of the coefficients are significant but most of the point 
estimates are negative. 
44 
 
These results seem to draw a worrying picture regarding the effect of the program on 
basic economic conditions. Amongst the inquiries of the survey, there is no area where the 
program showed a significant effect that could be interpreted as an improvement in household 
conditions. In fact, most point estimates indicate a negative effect of program receipt and, in 
several cases, are significant. However, our results should be interpreted with caution given 
measurement issues and the relatively low power associated with our sample size.  
 
 
2.6 Discussion and Conclusion 
 
We evaluate a social assistance program in Georgia using an original household survey 
and a regression discontinuity approach. Contrary to our expectations, we find that receiving the 
program leads to a worsening in (self-reported) basic economic conditions, such as the ability to 
afford food. We find patterns corresponding to a worsening in economic conditions in the 
answers to a sizeable number of different questions, though the results are significant only for a 
subset of those. 
The mean income of the households just below the threshold is slightly lower than the 
households just above the threshold.  While specific figures are not available in the data, the 
transfer amount certainly increased the mean income of the households just below the threshold 
to significantly higher levels than their above-threshold counterparts; at least at first.  So, the 
differences in responses to the survey by the two groups cannot be attributed to income, which 
were not significantly different amongst the groups at the time of the survey. 
These results should be interpreted with caution given the following caveats. First, our 
sample size is relatively small, both in absolute number and relative to the population. Second, 
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the regression discontinuity approach identifies the local average treatment effect around the 
threshold, and not the average treatment effect of the program. Third, we are relying on self-
reported data, which necessarily involves noise. A potentially greater concern is that program 
recipients may conceivably be less truthful in their answers if they are concerned about losing 
the program. Fourth, we are not measuring consumption (not to mention welfare) with precision 
due to the nature of the questions asked. 
To the extent that the recipients' worsening of economic conditions relative to the control 
is genuine, a natural question to ask is why that might be happening. One possibility is that the 
program crowds out other sources of income. In principle, the cash transfers could reduce 
receipts from other social programs, but that is not the case in the Georgian context. More 
relevant in our context may be reductions in remittances from family members abroad or in 
Georgia or other forms of private cash transfers. Alternatively, receiving the program could 
reduce incentives to work, as a previous study of the same program has found (Kits et al. 2013). 
However, it would require a very large elasticity of these other sources of income to the public 
transfers to generate the observed patterns. A very large elasticity may seem implausible, at least 
in the absence of other contributory factors.  
Another possibility is that the recipients invest both the transfers and additional resources 
in investments in durable goods or human capital. This could then lead to a lower ability to 
afford food (and other items) in the time window we are observing. In our data we do not 
observe that recipients own more durable goods than the control group. However, a previous 
study (Abramishvili & Lanchava 2015) has found that the same program had an effect on 
university enrollment for the children of the recipients. 
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Other explanations are possible. The program may change perceptions of conditions 
rather the conditions themselves. For example, a household may feel better off at first as they are 
able to consume more, but their preferences and behavior may actually dynamically change over 
time such that they perceive more goods that they now want but cannot afford (Dasso and 
Fernandez 2013). Alternatively, the cash transfers may lead to a 'Dutch disease' situation by 
encouraging consumption of “sin” goods, such as alcohol, tobacco, gambling, etc. (Devereux 
2002). Further, it is possible that differential (mis-) reporting by respondents drive our findings 
(Baird et al 2011). Which (if any) of the explanations suggested here holds has important 
implications for how the program should be viewed.  
Given the limitations of our study, our conclusions should be treated with caution. 
However, we believe that evidence subject to limitations is better than no evidence at all and that 
this study can be a useful step in understanding the effect of this program, as well as other cash 
transfer programs in transition countries. In light of our findings, we recommend that a thorough 
and extensive evaluation of the social assistance program in Georgia be conducted. For example, 
researchers could run another, much more extensive round of the survey that would reach a 
larger portion of the program applicant population as well as be more comprehensive in 
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Chapter 3: An Impact Evaluation of Mass Replacement of 





This paper investigates whether a unique education policy positively affected university 
enrollment rates of public school students in Georgia. Under the Georgian political initiative to 
decentralize school governance, the Ministry of Education and Science issued an order (N543) in 
July 2007, officially dismissing all public school principals and subsequently “randomly” 
assigning qualified candidates to public schools across the country, under the assumption that the 
replacement of the principals with randomly assigning qualified candidates to public schools 
would fairly decentralize and improve school governance across Georgia. About half of the 
public school principals were actually replaced with new candidates, a majority of whom were 
assigned through a random allocation mechanism.  
Accordingly, this paper uses a standard difference-in-differences methodology to 
compare treated public schools with private schools that are not affected by the policy, in order 
to identify how this reform impacted education outcomes. Using the National Assessment and 
Examination Center university admissions data, it can be seen that the public schools with 
replaced principals increased university enrollment more than the control schools by an average 
of 4%. The largest part of this increase comes from schools with randomly assigned principals.  
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The positive findings herein could impact education policy in developing (and perhaps 
developed) countries and invites further research where applicable. The statistically significant 
and strong effects of this type of reform could cause a positive domino effect in the developing 
world, especially in countries with similar characteristics and predicaments in their education 
system. 
The main objective of any school system is to improve student learning outcomes, 
cognitive skills, and socialization in society. In order to reach this objective and make schools 
more efficient, specific efforts are made by teachers, staff, and the principal school-wide. It is 
widely believed (Branch et al, 2012; Bloom et al., 2015 and Oduro et al, 2007) that the quality of 
the principal plays an important role in a school’s organizational success, as well as significantly 
affecting student scholastic achievements.  
As the majority of schools are financed by the government in most countries (including 
Georgia), public finance efficacy makes it necessary to create and implement policies that ensure 
that the highest quality principals are selected (or assigned) to public schools. 
School governing mechanisms vary significantly across developed and developing 
countries (Day and Sammons, 2013). In the developing world, many countries continue to 
maintain a centralized governance of schools, while other countries have taken steps towards 
decentralization (Patrinos and Fasih, 2009). Recently, much interest has been devoted to post-
communist countries where the totalitarian regime collapsed and the countries started building 
their own policies independently. The state of Georgia is one of the most studied countries 
among the former Soviet states. Indeed, Georgian government reforms implemented since 2003 




3.2 Georgian Education Reform of 2007 
 
Georgia became a sovereign state in 1991 and has since experienced unstable economic 
and political transition periods. In 2003, a reformist government took power through the Rose 
Revolution with the aim of modernizing the state, eliminating corruption, ensuring equal 
opportunities, and stabilizing the political-economic situation. The new government launched 
reforms in almost all systems of governance ranging from law enforcement to healthcare, 
including the decentralization of public school governance from the state. 
The Georgian governmental reform of the secondary school system was implemented as 
follows: First, in 2005, the public financing of elementary and secondary education was replaced 
with an enrollment-based voucher system.11 In 2006, following the initiative of the Ministry of 
Education and Science, each public school then elected a local governing board,12 which 
consisted of the principal, vice-principals, teachers, parents, and student representatives. The 
2006 initiative’s reorganization of school management paved the way for the principal 
replacement reform, with the government aiming to replace all public school principals in 2007. 
The Ministry of Education and Science officially dismissed all public school principals and 
announced a public tender for the open positions, that included a skills based exam, an interview 
process, and the combination of a meritocratic and random assignment mechanism. 
More specifically, the Ministry of Education and Science took the following steps:  
1) The Ministry dismissed all public school principals and announced an open tender for new 
leaders. The potential candidates (job seekers) registered themselves in a single administrative 
                                                 
 
11 This reform was uniform to all schools in Georgia. Each school received funds in an amount equivalent to the 
enrollment voucher times the number of students. 
12 Teachers, parents, and students were given the opportunity to participate in schools’ governance. This reform 
concerned only public schools. 
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district in which they would compete for a principal position. There were a total of 2200 open 
positions in 68 districts. Around 15000 registered candidates took a comprehensive, four-
component examination13 followed by individual, in-person interviews with regional 
representatives of the ministry. 
2) Based on the results of the standardized examination and passing the individual interviews, 
550014 candidates advanced to the final step in the hiring/replacement process. The examination 
evaluated not only literacy levels but also managerial skills. The content of each test covered 
managerial theories, such as resource management and planning for education. While this exam 
may not be a perfect proxy for principal ability, it was designed by the Georgian government to 
best appraise the knowledge and skills deemed most appropriate and necessary for principal 
success.    
3) The meritocratic part of the process gave the top 20% of approved candidates from each 
district the right to designate the school where they would undergo the final step—an interview 
with the school’s local governing board. Each school had a maximum of three candidate slots 
available. When more than three of the top 20% candidates expressed interest in the same school, 
their test results were sorted and priority was given to the higher scorers.15 Each top 20% 
candidate could choose only one school. However, if higher ranking candidates filled all three 
slots of their selected school, the candidate was permitted to name another target school; a 
process that repeated until all top 20% scorers had been assigned to a school. This important 
mechanism of the design removed the incentive for candidates to strategically choose schools 
based upon their ranking (thus eliminating a serious potential source of endogeneity from this 
                                                 
 
13 The examinations were in General Skills, Georgian Language, Law, and Case Study Analysis.  
14 This number is approximately a third of all initial participants.  
15 Priority of slot allocation was always based on the results of the test and individual interview. 
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natural experiment). While self-selection endogeneity remains in terms of these candidates 
choosing schools with better socio-economic conditions and/or where they strategically expected 
to have a better chance of obtaining the position due to social ties, this is directly accounted for 
in the conclusions to this study. The bottom 80% candidates were assigned by a random 
allocation mechanism (by lottery) to the remaining vacant slots in the final step—an interview 
with the local governing board. The lottery was transparent and all candidates had the 
opportunity to watch the results in real time. 
4) The local governing board of each school made the final selection decision. Each candidate 
underwent a single interview and was either chosen as the new principal or was dismissed from 
the process. The selection of a candidate depended solely on the decision of the governing board. 
A rejection of all three candidates resulted in the dismissed principal retaining his position until 
the next round of the replacement reform process.16 
Ministry representatives carefully monitored all processes to avoid nepotism or the 
intentional rejection of candidates in order to retain the incumbent principals. Only 53% of 
public schools selected new principals with 5-year terms based on the new policy. The remaining 
47% of public schools kept the existing principals. Unfortunately, as the data does not specify 
the identities of the candidates, there is no way to assess how many or which schools had the 
incumbent principal as one of their candidates.  
However, based upon the replacement mechanism design, the number of principals who 
could retain their position through successfully passing the exam as a top 20% principal, and thus 
who had the ability to choose the school where they had previously worked, cannot be large or 
significantly affect this analysis. 
                                                 
 
16 Next round of the principals’ replacement took place in 2011 and in case the principal resigned before the next 
rotation, the Ministry of Education had the right to assign a new candidate to the school. 
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New principals began their administration from the 2007/2008 academic year. The entire 
process is shown in the chain of blocks below.  
 
Illustration: Steps of Education Reform in 2007 
 
Overall, the reform represented a major transformation of the system and consisted, in 
part, of a randomization mechanism for the allocation of the candidates that scored in the bottom 
80% of the approved participants. Unfortunately, there is no comprehensive description 
explaining why the principals retained their positions in 47% of the schools. However, Ministry 
officials publicly disclosed the top two reasons incumbent principals remained in many rural and 
ethnic minority schools (2.9 % of schools constitute ethnic minority schools), which made up the 
vast majority of schools where the reform did not lead to a change of principal. While the most 
common reason at rural schools was a lack of candidates, at ethnic minority schools the linguistic 
issues were the most significant barriers to policy implementation. 
The reform resulted in the partitioning of all Georgian schools into four different groups:  
A) Private schools that were not affected by the policy.17 
                                                 
 
17 The convincing reason the reform would not change the behavior of the private school principals is compensation. 
Private sector principals are better paid than public sector principals. Unfortunately, the data did not provide 
information about teacher and student mobility between public and private schools.  
1
•All public school principals were dismissed.
•Candidates took a comprehensive exam.
2
•Top 20% candidates selected a preferred school.
•Bottom 80% candidates were assigned to schools by lottery.
3
•A maximum of 3 candidates were assigned to each school. 
•The schools' governing boards made their final decision.
4
•Private schools not affected.
•Public schools: 47% kept original principal; 53% ended up with either one of the top 20% 
of candidates that selected that specific school OR one of the bottom 80% of candidates 
that were assigned to interview at that school
54 
 
B) Public schools that did not replace the existing principal (47% of schools).18 
C) Public schools that chose one of the top 20% candidates that specified their school of 
preference (27% of schools).  
D) Public schools that chose one of the randomly assigned (by lottery) candidates from 
the bottom 80% of those that passed the exam (26% of schools).  
Since the majority of newly elected principals (based on standardized test scores and passing the 
in-person interview) were assigned through a random allocation mechanism (by lottery), the 
reform offers a quasi-natural experiment that partitioned schools into control (group A) and 
treatment groups (groups B, C, and D, where only group D is randomly assigned). 
3.3 Literature and Contribution 
 
A major part of the empirical literature that studies the characteristics of effective school 
governance focuses on principals. Leadership is often considered a main factor in the 
organizational success of schools and it is believed that it has direct and indirect effects upon 
student academic performance. Indirectly, principals may promote student outcomes through 
enhancing conditions for teaching and learning (infrastructure, safety, monitoring, etc.). Directly, 
school leaders could have an impact on teaching quality through teacher turnover and training 
(Day & Sammons, 2013; Robinson et al., 2009). Usually, it is difficult to disentangle the causal 
effect of school principals on learning outcomes (Branch et al, 2012), because schools are 
heterogeneous and leadership might contribute less at schools of higher quality and vice versa. 
                                                 
 
18 Group B contains both the schools that chose their former principal as well as those that rejected all applicants.  
As discussed earlier, the former cannot make up any significant portion of the whole group. 
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Although some variation in student/school learning outcomes is attributed to principals, no 
consensus exists on the amount or the mechanism of how principals impact the educational 
outcomes within/across schools.    
Literature on school leadership in developing countries also focuses on principals, their 
role in managing schools, ‘plant-level’ management tasks, and on external reform initiatives 
promoted by governments. Bloom et al. (2015) find a strong association between the quality of a 
principal and the learning outcomes of pupils. They surveyed 1800 schools across 8 countries 
(including developed) and concluded that higher management quality is strongly associated with 
better educational outcomes, with half of the variation being attributed to principal leadership 
and school governance.  
As education systems vary across countries due to cultural diversity, it is important to 
study this concept in the within-country context (Heck 1996). Systemic reforms in school 
governance in developing countries have attracted many scholars who have pointed towards the 
importance of principals. Studies demonstrate that school leaders still face non-bureaucratic 
challenges even after decentralizing policies have been implemented in developing countries 
(Oplatka, 2004). However, there are only a handful of studies available on the effectiveness of 
school leaders in developing countries (Oduro et al, 2007), which makes new evidence based 
analyses necessary.  
Compared to existing studies, this work investigates a large-scale, unique, and partially 
exogenous variation of principal turnover and its effect on school outcomes. In addition, it 
exploits the fact that the reform replaced a majority of the principals through a lottery 
mechanism, which makes the reform distinctive and worth studying.     
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Moreover, this paper is the first study of this particular education reform policy in 
Georgia, and it investigates the effects of this education policy on scholastic achievement. At the 
time of this reform, however, no standardized exams—such as the secondary school final exams 
that were implemented in the 2010/2011 school year—were taken by the students affected by 
this reform. Therefore, Georgian university enrollment rates are employed as a proxy for this 
measure. There are two advantages of studying university enrollment rates: 1) it proxies the 
student’s scholastic achievement as well as willingness and ability to acquire higher education 
and increase human capital and 2) it is the most accurate and universal measure covering the full 
panel of schools throughout the years of the study. Furthermore, there is no other measure that 
would uncover the school-level dynamics of scholastic achievements in Georgia. Using standard 
Difference-In-Differences (DID) methodology, the results show that the public schools with 
replaced principals increased university enrollments by an average of 4% more than the control 
schools.  
Interestingly, the results also reveal the importance of the assignment mechanism. The 
largest part of this increase comes from schools with lottery-assigned principals. Those public 
schools where the principals were replaced through random assignment performed better in 
terms of university admissions (6% more than control) than those schools that had principals 
who were able to influence their school assignment. Specifically, schools with replaced 
principals (groups 3 and 4) improved their academic standing by 6.4 % and the schools with the 
lottery assigned principals (group 4) increased the relative enrollment rate by 9.5%. Given that 
the national average enrollment rate19 is 63%, this reform produced considerable gains.    
                                                 
 
19Enrollment rate is the share of applicants who were admitted. 
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In addition, this paper investigates the school-choice preferences of principals. The 
results show that, with respect to the year before the reform, there is no significant difference 
between the university enrollment rates of the schools with principles from the quintile above the 
threshold (principals who chose the schools) and schools with principals from the quintile just 
below the threshold (who were assigned based on random allocation). In Georgia, the roles of 
principals are almost the same as in most other countries (improve learning environments, 
monitor the teaching process, administration, etc.), but there is a cultural specificity in terms of 
the education system and schooling, i.e. the magnitude of the social connections is probably 
higher than the international average. It is assumed that randomly assigned principals lack social 
and political ties at the school, which allows for more intra-school reform, while the principals 
who chose the schools are less likely to enact significant reforms due to likely existing political 
ties. Evidence of this effect exists, but is not a documented variable in the dataset. 
Furthermore, covariate plots between the groups show that there is a selection effect 
occurring, with the top 20% principals choosing already better schools in terms of socio-
economic characteristics. Along with the DID results, these findings indicate that the average 
lottery-assigned principal was able to improve their school’s university enrollment rate more 
than the average principal who was able to influence their school assignment. However, it is 
unclear which underlying mechanisms are causing which effects. 
3.4 Data 
 
To assess the effect of the principal on school-level scholastic achievements, nation-wide 
standardized university admissions data from 2005 to 2010 were used to compile university 
enrollment rates and were linked to the principals of the schools. The school level university 
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enrollment rate is a proxy of student scholastic achievement as well as willingness and ability to 
pursue higher education after graduating from secondary school. The necessary data was 
acquired from the National Assessment and Examination Center (NAEC), affiliated with 
Georgia’s Ministry of Education and Science. The NAEC collects data annually on student 
admissions, entry examinations, and scholarship allocations related to accredited universities in 
Georgia. Since the 2005 reform, secondary school graduates who wish to enter university take 
mandatory exams (unified tests) on general skills, Georgian, a foreign language, and a fourth 
subject corresponding to the student’s specialization. 
Table 3.1 below shows the numbers of schools with students (at least one student) 
registered for university admission exams administered by the NAEC for the 2005-2010 periods. 
Schools are categorized based on the reform partitioning. There are four different groups of 
schools in the sample. Private schools (no direct effect from the policy), public schools without 
principal replacement, public schools with replacement of principals by top 20% candidates, and 
public schools with principal replacement by lottery candidates (bottom 80% of principals based 
on the test results). 
The numbers are stable over the years except for the 2008/2009 academic year when the 
government extended the years of schooling from 11 to 12 and, consequently, demand for higher 
education and associated exams declined. Although there were some schools that fell outside of 
the regulated extension, e.g. schools for ethnic minorities, 2008 is omitted from the analysis as it 






Table 3.1. Private and public schools in the NAEC data from 2005 to 2010. 
Schools in Georgia Year 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total 
Private 217 173 198 20 180 204 992 
Public Without Principal Replacement 953 994 804 132 833 953 4669 
Public with Top 20% Principal 316 326 295 28 346 341 1652 
Public with Bottom 80% Principal 226 246 221 19 249 242 1203 
Total 1712 1739 1518 199 1608 1740 8516 
 
For the purpose of this analysis, data was obtained from the Ministry of Education and 
Science on school characteristics such as size, address, share of socially disadvantaged pupils, 
and the number of teachers for each school. In addition, the ministry provided statistical data on 
the education reforms such as candidates’ registration district, their identifiers, test results, and 
the names of their assigned/chosen schools based on the top 20 or bottom 80 percent categories. 
Figure 3.1 below presents the distribution of all candidates’ test results. It is clear that the 
distribution resembles a normal density function, which might mean that the exam was well 
balanced.  
Figure 3.1. Distribution of test results of all passing candidates.   
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Merging these two data sets forms a panel of the schools from 2005 to 2010, which 
combines all schools with the covariates and the outcome variable. Specifically, the outcome 
variable is the university enrollment rate attained by the annual cohort of students from a school. 
It is defined as the ratio of students successfully admitted to university from a particular school 
out of the total number of university applicants from that school; i.e. the latter being equivalent 
to the number of the secondary school’s graduates that take the NAEC exam. This variable 
proxies scholastic achievement and measures the size of ability and willingness to continue 
schooling in higher education. It varies from 0 to 1.   
Figure 3.2 presents the distributions of the university enrollment rates across the country. 
Following descriptive analysis, it was concluded that the main reason for the considerable 
numbers of 0s and 1s in the data is mostly due to the high number of very small schools from 
where only a few students apply to university each year (regression results do not materially 
change with the weighted inclusion of the small schools; see table 3.A3 in appendix 3.A). 
Schools with five applicants or less were designated as small schools in the sample. This 
threshold was determined as optimal since adding another marginal extension of the number 
(from five to six) does not change the results, and the overall findings become and remain stable 
over the specification. Hence, smaller schools were omitted from the analysis in order to avoid 
over/under estimating results.  Figure 3.2 also suggests that the distributions of the university 
enrollment rates are skewed to the right for 2009 and 2010. While this change could be the 
outcome of the additional year of study (except at ethnic schools) in 2008, it does not affect the 





Figure 3.2. Distribution of university enrollment rates from 2005 to 2010.  
 
Source: The National Assessment and Examination Center of Georgia 
Figure 3.3 plots annual averages of university enrollment rates over the years. Based on 
the fitted values line, schools in Georgia have been positively trending in terms of the university 
enrollment rate since 2005. This is accounted for in the analysis through time effects. Further, 
figure 3.3 shows that the country level average of the university enrollment rate noticeably 
decreased in 2007. The main reason for this decline is the university accreditation process.20 As 
places were limited because some universities could not admit students in that year, the rate 
dropped uniformly for public and private schools.      
 
 
                                                 
 
20 The Georgian government created new quality control requirements for public and private universities. They were 
required to meet the new minimum standards during the 2006/2007 school year to be able to continue to enroll 
students in the 2007/2008 school year and onwards.  Many universities did not pass the accreditation program until 
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Figure 3.3. School level university enrollment rates in Georgia from 2005 to 2010.   
 
Source: The National Assessment and Examination Center of Georgia 
3.5 Empirical Models 
 
Given that the education policy partitioned schools in terms of a clear control group 
(private schools) and quasi-treatment groups (the three categories of public schools affected by 
the policy), this study aims to estimate the effect of the education policy on school scholastic 
achievements (through the proxy of university enrollment rates). To do so, a difference-in-
differences methodology is applied (Abadie, 2005; Angrist and Pischke, 2009). The 
mathematical formulation of the model is the following:  
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where 𝑦𝑖 stands for the outcome variable, 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑖 is a period indicator dummy variable, which 
equals 0 before the reform and 1 after the policy implementation. The variable 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖 denotes 
the treatment status of the school 𝑖. It attains 1 if the school falls within one of the treatment 
groups (B, C, and/or D) and 0 if not. A vector of covariates 𝑋𝑖 is a set of explanatory variables, 
which might have explanatory power in the model (size of the school, teacher-student ratio, the 
percentage of economically vulnerable pupils in the school, location, etc.). Coefficient estimates 
of 𝛽3 measure the difference-in-difference of the outcome variable for a treatment group. While 
private schools serve as a clear control, given the mechanism of the reform, the multiple 
treatment groups can be subdivided into five meaningful treatment groups.  
1) All public schools = Groups B, C, and D 
2) Public schools without principal replacements = Group B 
3) Public schools with replaced principals = Groups C and D 
4) Public schools with replaced principals from bottom 80% candidates = Group D 
5) Public schools with replaced principals from top 20% candidates = Group C 
Consequently, five different DID regressions have been run.   
Since the school panel data includes 2-year time spans before and after the reform, the 
general DID framework is extended by the addition of interaction terms with respect to time 
dummy variables. This modification allows us to investigate the dynamics of the outcome 
variables for each year.  This modified version of the DID methodology is as follows:  
𝑦𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝑖. 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽2 ∙ 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖 + 𝛽3 ∙ 𝑖. 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖 ∙ 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖 + 𝑖 
where all variables remain unchanged with the exception of the period indicator, which is now a 
specific year indicator. That is, 𝑖. 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 is a dummy variable for each year, equaling 1 if for a 
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particular year and 0 otherwise. This modification also allows us to investigate the effect across 
the years.  
After the reform, three types of principals governed the public schools. The principals 
who did not choose the school themselves because of the lottery (bottom 80%), those who chose 
preferred schools (top 20%), and those principals who were not replaced by the policy. In order 
to estimate the effect of another “treatment”, that of random assignment, one must compare the 
outcomes of the C and D groups of principals (the top 20% that were given target school 
preference and the bottom 80% which were assigned randomly) through a Regression 
Discontinuity Design (Lee and Lemieux, 2010):  
𝑦𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 ∙ 𝑇𝑖 + 𝑓(𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖) + 𝑖 
where 𝑦𝑖 is a set of school level characteristics (socio-economic, university enrollment rate, etc.), 
𝑇𝑖 is the treatment dummy. It equals 1 if the principal is from the top 20% and 0 if not. 
Importantly, the observations of the RDD are limited to subjects symmetrically around the 
threshold. 𝑓(𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖) is a polynomial function of the principals’ test scores from the selection 





As discussed in the methodology section, Georgia’s schools were partitioned into 
different groups based on the inherent characteristics of the education reform. Given that the 
policy intended to change the principals in all public schools but would have no direct effect on 
65 
 
private schools, the five groupings of public schools were used as the treatment groups studied in 
comparison with the private schools as the control group. To reiterate, the treatment group 
categorization of the public schools are the following: 1) all public schools, 2) public schools 
without principal replacements, 3) public schools with replaced principals, 4) public schools with 
replaced principals from the bottom 80% of candidates, and 5) public schools with replaced 
principals from the top 20% of candidates. Below is a visual representation. 
 
For each difference-in-difference group pairing, the parallel trend assumption was 
checked and all divergent covariates were incorporated into the model as control variables. 
Specifically, all observed covariates were studied as outcome variables and were analyzed to 
discern whether treatment status made any difference in them. School size, teacher-student ratio, 
and poverty changed both over time and as treatment status. Therefore, they were added to the 
regressions as control variables in order to avoid misinterpretation of results. The results of the 
five DID regressions are presented in table 3.2, displaying the estimated differences of the 
impact of the policy for each public school grouping versus the private school control group. 
Specific year results, along with school fixed effect analyses, are presented in table 3.3.  
From table 3.2, it is evident that the average public school results deteriorated in terms of 
university enrollment rates. However, the reason for this decline most likely results from the 
Private Schools
(I) Public Schools
(II) Public schools without 
replacement
(III) Public schools with 
replacement
(IV) Public schools with 
replacement by Bottom 80%
(V) Public schools with 
replacement by Top 20%
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highly negative outcomes of the public schools where the principals were not replaced. Those 
schools underperformed significantly after the reform, which is apparent from the second 
regression results. Comparing the second regression results to the remaining regression results 
seems to confirm this explanation. In particular, public schools with principal replacements had 
increased university enrollment rates by an average of 4% more than the control schools.  
Further, the largest part of this increase comes from schools with lottery assigned principals. 
 
 
Table 3.2. Coefficient estimates of Difference-in-Differences for each treatment category.   
Pairwise comparisons of the 
private and one of the 5 public 
school categories 
 
Impact of the Policy 
(With covariates) 
 
Impact of the Policy  
(Without covariates) 
N of Obs.  
 







Private vs II (Public Schools 







Private vs III (Public Schools with 







Private vs IV (Public Schools 







Private vs V (Public Schools with 







Notes:  Coefficients in all columns are DID regression estimates, robust standard errors are in parentheses; 
** and * indicate significance at the 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Covariates are: size, teacher-student 
ratio, and poverty. 2008 is omitted from the analysis. 
 
Table 3.3 shows that by 2010 enrollment rates for public school students declined by an 
average of 5 percentage points after the reform compared to the control group. However, the 
magnitude of the effect increases in absolute terms for those students who came from the public 
schools where principals were not replaced. Their performance relatively worsened by 10 
percentage points. The estimates in Table 3.3 also suggest that those public schools where the 
policy replaced the principal comparatively improved their university enrollment rates by an 
average of 4%. While the schools with the top 20% replacement principals seem not to differ 
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significantly with the control group, the schools with lottery assigned principals appear to have 
advanced the most, with a 6% increased rate over control on average.  
 
Table 3.3. Coefficient estimates of Difference-in-Differences for each treatment category, 





of the private 
and one of 
the 5 public 
school 
categories 
The Impact of the Policy on the University Enrollment Rate 
Before the Education Policy 
2005                     2006 
After the Education Policy 
2009                          2010 
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Notes:  Coefficients in all columns are DID regression estimates, robust standard errors 
are in parentheses; ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. All regressions control the covariate (size, teacher-student ratio, poverty) if 
the systematic differences are observed over the groups. Year 2008 is omitted from the 
analysis.  
 
Figure 3.4 below visually represents the four years of university enrollment rate 
dynamics for the different categories of public schools from table 3.3. The scatter plots 
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demonstrate that public schools underperformed in general, while the schools with lottery 
assigned principals advanced over the years, and the gap between those and private schools 
narrowed most in 2010.  
 
Figure 3.4. Dynamics of university enrollment rates for each grouping of schools.  
 
Source: The National Assessment and Examination Center of Georgia 
 In order to estimate the effect of the policy for schools with lottery assigned principals 
and those which were chosen by the principals, another DiD regression was used in which 
randomly assigned schools are considered as treatment group.  As table 3.4 presents, the average 



























2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Year
Private Schools Schools Without Replacement
Shools With Bottom 80% Principals Shools With Top 20% Principals
2007 - Year of Education Reform in Georgia
Univeristy Enrollment Rates for 4 Categories of Schools
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Table 3.4. DID egression estimates of the effect of the policy reform 
Comparison of two types of public schools  Impact of the Policy 
N of Obs.  
Adj.  R-
squared 





Notes:  Coefficients in all columns are DID regression estimates, robust standard errors are in 
parentheses; ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Year 2008 is omitted from the analysis. 
 
To identify the underlying effects and understand the difference in the results from 
groups four and five from the DID empirical methodology, a regression discontinuity design 
method was applied using the test score threshold of the top 20% versus the second 20% scorers 
prior to the reform. That is, the distance from the threshold can go up or down by a maximum of 
20% (i.e. the top scorer versus the 40th percentile scorer). Appendix tables 3.A1 and 3.A2 present 
the RDD regression results, which compare the school-level characteristics for the schools with 
principals that were given preferential choice and the schools with principals assigned by lottery. 
The method is conducted around the threshold at both 10% and 20% distances to assess if any 
differences exist closer to the threshold, while attempting to keep a large enough sample size.  
Already at the 10% distance, the sample size reaches a questionable lower envelope of 273 
observations in total.  
The outcomes indicate that the top 20% principals’ schools underperformed in terms of 
university enrollment rates relative to their counterparts, although the result is not statistically 
significant. Furthermore, at the 10% distance analysis, even the directionality of the effect does 
not hold. The variable “Distance to threshold” from tables 3.A1 and 3.A2 displays the 
explanatory power of the score distance from the threshold. While it is strongly statistically 
significant, the effect is almost zero in real terms.   
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Covariate balance plots over treatment status are plotted in Figures 3.A3 and 3.A4 in the 
Appendix. They obviously indicate a selection effect. A graphical representation of the 
discontinuity is given in figure 3.A1 in the Appendix. It demonstrates that there is a discontinuity 






One of the most influential factors in student scholastic achievements is principal quality 
(Branch et al, 2012). Even though a direct link between principals and students usually does not 
exist, principals impact students heavily through two different channels. First, they can improve 
teaching quality in the classroom through teacher turnover, regular monitoring, training, and 
incentive systems for teachers. Second, principals can improve the overall environment at a 
school, making it more conducive to learning. For instance, they can increase safety measures, 
improve staff quality, and introduce student achievement incentives. In addition, a good principal 
may be able to harmonize the cooperation between schools and parents.  
In Georgia, the duties and roles of principals are much the same as in most other 
countries; however, there is a cultural specificity in terms of the education system and schooling. 
The magnitude of the social connections is probably higher than the international average. As a 
result of these cultural issues, terminating teacher employment as a teaching quality 
improvement instrument may not be a viable option for those principals with existing social ties. 
Antithetically, the bottom 80% candidate principals who were assigned by lottery were usually 
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completely foreign to the academic and/or social communities of the schools where they became 
principals. 
Based on the intentions and the mechanism of the education reform, the average 
replacement principal, including those who managed to return to their schools after passing the 
exam, were of a higher quality than the original principals. Thus, they should improve the 
average outcomes of those schools. This should be reflected through a more-or-less 
monotonically increasing improvement, which should, theoretically, be even greater for the 
higher scoring principals. Since that was not the case, only three reasonable explanations remain 
as to why the bottom 80% principal schools outperformed all of their counterpart schools:  
1) Both the unchanged principals and the top 20% candidate principals are existing 
members of the academic and/or social community of those chosen schools and are 
thus unable to enact necessary reforms due to the strong socialization issues discussed 
above;  
2) There is a selection effect in place—the top 20% candidate principals chose schools 
with higher quality and were then unable to further improve the school’s performance 
despite being high quality principals; 
3) The unchanged principals remaining in predominantly lower-performing schools 
were under-qualified or unmotivated to improve those schools before their anticipated 
replacement in the second round of the reform in 2011.  
 While the covariate plots (in the Appendix) and the RDD results of the currently 
available data seem to confirm that all three of these effects are at work in this case (otherwise 
there would be a far greater and more significant jump at the threshold) it is not possible to 
distinguish amongst these effects and their magnitudes.  
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This lack of identification is due in part to the fact that the 2007 reform was not 
successful in replacing all the principals in the country’s public schools. This failure 
automatically affected the behavior of the remaining school leaders, particularly since those 
principles who remained due to the failed process were informed that the government would 
replace them four years later.  The DID regression results show that those schools were seriously 
negatively affected in terms of the university enrollment rate proxy. This means that this policy 
reform was detrimental to half of the public schools and their students. While this negative 
spillover effect of the reform was not intended, it provides one of the key lessons for the 




 This research attempts to elucidate whether a principal really matters and, if so, does 
leadership make a sizable difference in educational outcomes. Specifically, it evaluates the 
impact between the quality of a principal (in terms of his/her standardized exam results) and 
student educational outcomes (in terms of standardized university admissions). It does so by 
analyzing and numerically documenting the effect of this unique education policy measure (the 
sharp replacement and random assignment of principals) on the Georgian public school system at 
the secondary education level. The main finding is that the new principals improved university 
enrollment rates more than the control schools by an average of 4%, with the majority of this 
significant increase coming from schools with lottery-assigned candidate principals.  
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Identifying the effectiveness of this reform might play a significant role in policy-making 
decisions, particularly in developing countries with similar characteristics and predicaments in 
their education systems. While there is a relatively sizeable body of research on the effectiveness 
of principals in OECD countries, to this researcher’s knowledge, this work represents the first 
study in Georgia and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Further, this paper is 
important as it provides a pioneer study on a uniquely large-scale and contributes to the 
understanding of the somewhat elusive area of education economics. The findings can materially 
contribute to ongoing academic and political debates about how to improve educational 
outcomes in public schools and could be useful for policy makers in both developing and 
developed countries. Indeed, it now seems clear that the lottery mechanism may have a 
significantly greater positive effect than a preference-based allocation of principals and could be 
a key element in any similar future reforms, particularly in any country where education 
corruption, political influences, and/or social ties are of concern. 
 As it is not possible to disentangle the reform’s effects with the currently available data, 
this research should be extended once the reform is completed and sufficient time has passed to 
allow for delayed effects to occur. A follow up study that would use the outcome data from the 
second (or additional) phase(s) of this policy reform could then be used to disentangle and 
properly identify the individual magnitudes of the quality, lottery, and selection effects that make 
up the current results of the two different groups of new principals described in the study. The 
results of the extended study could then provide more comprehensive policy design 
recommendations.  
Alternatively, the data used herein could be employed in another vein. The differences in 
school characteristics chosen just above or not chosen just below the 20% threshold are quite 
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interesting and informative. There is little compelling evidence in the literature about principal or 
even teacher preferences, and this data could provide just such an analysis. While this dimension 
may actually hinder identification herein, using it similarly as in this paper in place of the 
existing emphasis on the identification of sorting effects on student outcomes, could reveal 
interesting parts of other economic decisions and incentives. For example, administrative data 
showing the distribution of principals among schools or even their transitions amongst schools 
cannot separate demand from supply. The RDD method, however, can compare almost identical 
principals across the threshold and thus uncover preferences regarding school characteristics. 
This could illustrate the advantages certain schools have in attracting highly skilled principals, 
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Table 3.A1: Effect of school choice on university enrollment rates for schools with Top 
20% and Second 20% scoring principals 
 
 Type of Principal, 1 if Top 20% and 0 if Bottom 80% 
University Enrollment Rate -.01 (.01) 
Distance to threshold .0008 *** (.0002) 
Teacher-student ratio .003 * (.002) 
Location .10*** (.01) 
Poverty Ratio -.22*** (.04) 
Notes:  Coefficients are RDD regression estimates, robust standard errors are in parentheses; 
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Regression 
includes linear distance to the threshold as well as control variables. Number of observations is 
535 and Adj. R-squared equals 0.1. Location refers to the dummy variable which equals 1 if 
the school is in a city and 0 otherwise.  
 
 
Table 3.A2: Effect of school choice on university enrollment rates for schools with 
principals scoring within 10% above and below the threshold 
 
 Type of Principal, 1 if Top 20% and 0 if Bottom 80% 
University Enrollment Rate .02 (.03) 
Distance to threshold .0005** (.0003) 
Teacher-student ratio .003 (.003) 
Location .11** (.02) 
Poverty Ratio -.27*** (.04) 
Notes:  Coefficients are RDD regression estimates, robust standard errors are in parentheses; 
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Regression 
includes linear distance to the threshold as well as control variables. Number of observations is 
535 and Adj. R-squared equals 0.14. Location refers to the dummy variable which equals 1 if 










Table 3.A3: Regression results when the small schools are dropped/are not dropped from the 
sample 
Pairwise comparisons of the 
private and one of the 5 public 
school categories 
 
Regression results when 
the small schools are 
dropped from the sample 
 
Regression results when 
the small schools are not 
dropped from the sample 
N of Obs.  
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Figure 3.A1: University enrollment rates for public schools with top 20% and second 20% 
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Figure 3.A2: University enrollment rates for public schools with principals scoring within 10% 
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The first paper investigates the impact of unconditional cash transfers in Georgia on 
university enrollment. The program selects recipients based upon a quantitative poverty 
threshold, which gives us the ability to implement a regression discontinuity approach. We use 
the data on program recipients from the SSA and on university admissions from the NAEC and 
combine these into a single dataset. First of all, we observe that the enrollment rate in the sample 
of poorest Georgian households is very low relative to the national average. We find that being a 
recipient in the program significantly increases a student’s likelihood of university enrollment, 
by 6.3%. In comparison, Fack and Grenet (2015) report up to a 7% increase in university 
enrollment as a result of 1500 Euro need-based scholarships allocated to potential university 
students in France. The large effects of cash transfers on enrollment rates in Georgia are 
particularly notable. First of all, unlike in France, cash transfers in Georgia were unconditional. 
Second, the amount of cash transfers to Georgian households, which averaged 46 US dollars for 
an average family, was notably smaller relative to the 1500 Euro scholarships in France, even 
when adjusting for PPP and median income differences.  
If unconditional transfers have such a strong impact on university enrollment by poor 
students, then the Georgian government may want to consider further complementary approaches 
to nudge the poor to invest in skills and education; which may help break the poverty cycle. 
Furthermore, politicians might also opt for conditional transfer programs, such as need-based 
university scholarships that could encourage students from poor family backgrounds to continue 
their education. Such measures could reduce the pressure to leave the educational system and 
start working early with low education levels and correspondingly low productivity and income 
levels. In fact, such conditional programs could have an even greater positive effect upon 
education outcomes than the unconditional transfers. 
We also find a gender specific effect. While cash transfers increase overall university 
enrollment rates in Georgia, the effect for males is much stronger than the average effect (13.4% 
vs. 6.3% in the pre-modification findings and 18.1% vs. 11% in the post-modification findings). 
We also observe that the impact of cash transfers on university enrollment is stronger for the 
oldest children in a family. Finally, as noted, the negative coefficient on Tbilisi may be an 
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indication that cash transfers most effectively help students from rural regions, as the costs of 
higher education are greater for these applicants. The misallocation of regional talent may in turn 
adversely impact the overall quality of education and heighten the current skills mismatch in the 
labor sector21 in Georgia. Effectively, this would likely lessen the productivity of workers and 
ultimately generate some degree of welfare loss. Therefore, this study should encourage policy 
aimed at increasing education outcomes, taking into account gender and location heterogeneity. 
 
The second paper evaluates a social assistance program in Georgia using an original 
household survey and a regression discontinuity approach. Contrary to our expectations, we find 
that receiving the program leads to a worsening in (self-reported) basic economic conditions, 
such as the ability to afford food. We find patterns corresponding to a worsening in economic 
conditions in the answers to a sizeable number of different questions, though the results are 
significant only for a subset of those. 
These results should be interpreted with caution given the following caveats. First, our 
sample size is relatively small, both in absolute number and relative to the population. Second, 
the regression discontinuity approach identifies the local average treatment effect around the 
threshold, and not the average treatment effect of the program. Third, we are relying on self-
reported data, which necessarily involves noise. A potentially greater concern is that program 
recipients may conceivably be less truthful in their answers if they are concerned about losing 
the program. Fourth, we are not measuring consumption (not to mention welfare) with precision 
due to the nature of the questions asked. 
To the extent that the recipients' worsening of economic conditions relative to the control 
is genuine, a natural question to ask is why that might be happening. One possibility is that the 
program crowds out other sources of income. In principle, the cash transfers could reduce 
receipts from other social programs, but that is not the case in the Georgian context. More 
relevant in our context may be reductions in remittances from family members abroad or in 
Georgia or other forms of private cash transfers. Alternatively, receiving the program could 
reduce incentives to work, as a previous study of the same program has found (Kits et al. 2013). 
However, it would require a very large elasticity of these other sources of income to the public 
                                                 
 
21World Economic Forum’s Executive Opinion Survey, 2012. 
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transfers to generate the observed patterns. A very large elasticity may seem implausible, at least 
in the absence of other contributory factors.  
Another possibility is that the recipients invest both the transfers and additional resources 
in investments in durable goods or human capital. This could then lead to a lower ability to 
afford food (and other items) in the time window we are observing. In our data we do not 
observe that recipients own more durable goods than the control group. However, a previous 
study (Abramishvili & Lanchava 2015) has found that the same program had an effect on 
university enrollment for the children of the recipients. 
Other explanations are possible. The program may change perceptions of conditions 
rather the conditions themselves. For example, a household may feel better off at first as they are 
able to consume more, but their preferences and behavior may actually dynamically change over 
time such that they perceive more goods that they now want but cannot afford (Dasso and 
Fernandez 2013). Alternatively, the cash transfers may lead to a 'Dutch disease' situation by 
encouraging consumption of “sin” goods, such as alcohol, tobacco, gambling, etc. (Devereux 
2002). Further, it is possible that differential (mis-) reporting by respondents drive our findings 
(Baird et al 2011). Which (if any) of the explanations suggested here holds has important 
implications for how the program should be viewed.  
Given the limitations of our study, our conclusions should be treated with caution. 
However, we believe that evidence subject to limitations is better than no evidence at all and that 
this study can be a useful step in understanding the effect of this program, as well as other cash 
transfer programs in transition countries. In light of our findings, we recommend that a thorough 
and extensive evaluation of the social assistance program in Georgia be conducted. For example, 
researchers could run another, much more extensive round of the survey that would reach a 
larger portion of the program applicant population as well as be more comprehensive in 
obtaining a financial assessment of the households similar to the one done as part of the program 
application. 
 
The third paper attempts to elucidate whether a principal really matters and, if so, does 
leadership make a sizable difference in educational outcomes. Specifically, it evaluates the 
impact between the quality of a principal (in terms of his/her standardized exam results) and 
student educational outcomes (in terms of standardized university admissions). It does so by 
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analyzing and numerically documenting the effect of this unique education policy measure (the 
sharp replacement and random assignment of principals) on the Georgian public school system at 
the secondary education level. The main finding is that the new principals improved university 
enrollment rates more than the control schools by an average of 4%, with the majority of this 
significant increase coming from schools with lottery-assigned candidate principals.  
Identifying the effectiveness of this reform might play a significant role in policy-making 
decisions, particularly in developing countries with similar characteristics and predicaments in 
their education systems. While there is a relatively sizeable body of research on the effectiveness 
of principals in OECD countries, to this researcher’s knowledge, this work represents the first 
study in Georgia and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Further, this paper is 
important as it provides a pioneer study on a uniquely large-scale and contributes to the 
understanding of the somewhat elusive area of education economics. The findings can materially 
contribute to ongoing academic and political debates about how to improve educational 
outcomes in public schools and could be useful for policy makers in both developing and 
developed countries. Indeed, it now seems clear that the lottery mechanism may have a 
significantly greater positive effect than a preference-based allocation of principals and could be 
a key element in any similar future reforms, particularly in any country where education 
corruption, political influences, and/or social ties are of concern. 
 As it is not possible to disentangle the reform’s effects with the currently available data, 
this research should be extended once the reform is completed and sufficient time has passed to 
allow for delayed effects to occur. A follow up study that would use the outcome data from the 
second (or additional) phase(s) of this policy reform could then be used to disentangle and 
properly identify the individual magnitudes of the quality, lottery, and selection effects that make 
up the current results of the two different groups of new principals described in the study. The 
results of the extended study could then provide more comprehensive policy design 
recommendations.  
Alternatively, the data used herein could be employed in another vein. The differences in 
school characteristics chosen just above or not chosen just below the 20% threshold are quite 
interesting and informative. There is little compelling evidence in the literature about principal or 
even teacher preferences, and this data could provide just such an analysis. While this dimension 
may actually hinder identification herein, using it similarly as in this paper in place of the 
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existing emphasis on the identification of sorting effects on student outcomes, could reveal 
interesting parts of other economic decisions and incentives. For example, administrative data 
showing the distribution of principals among schools or even their transitions amongst schools 
cannot separate demand from supply. The RDD method, however, can compare almost identical 
principals across the threshold and thus uncover preferences regarding school characteristics. 
This could illustrate the advantages certain schools have in attracting highly skilled principals, 
which could also provide important evidence for academic and policy pursuits. 
 
